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WHY DO STARTUPS USE TRADE SECRETS?
David S. Levine* & Ted Sichelman**

Empirical studies of the use of trade secrecy are scant, and those focusing on startups,
nonexistent. In this Article, we present the first set of data—drawn from the Berkeley Patent
Survey—on the use of trade secrets by U.S. startup companies in the software, biotechnology,
medical device, and hardware industries. Specifically, we report on the prevalence of trade secrecy
usage among startups. Additionally, we assess the importance of trade secrets in relation to other
forms of intellectual property protection and barriers to entry, such as patents, copyrights, firstmover advantage, and complementary assets. We segment these results by a variety of factors,
including industry, company business model, overall revenue, patenting propensity, funding
sources, innovation types, and licensing. From this segmentation, we implement a basic regression model and report on those factors showing a statistically significant relationship in the use
of trade secrets by startups. Our results point to three major findings. First, trade secrecy serves
other important aims aside from first-mover advantage. Second, trade secrets may act both as
economic complements and substitutes to patenting. Third, trade secrets may serve as important
strategic assets, functioning much in the same manner as patents in terms of licensing and
setting the boundaries of the firm.
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INTRODUCTION
Magic Leap is a startup company that is active in the exploding field of
augmented reality, head-mounted displays that “superimpose[ ] 3D computer-generated imagery over real world objects.”1 In 2016, it was one of the
first companies to sue under the recently passed Defend Trade Secrets Act
(DTSA), the first federal law to provide broad protection for private litigants
over trade secrets.2 Suits like Magic Leap’s are becoming common, with the
“amount and significance” of trade secret litigation “exploding” over the past
thirty years.3
Yet, despite this massive increase in the number of suits—and the
increasing characterization of trade secrecy as part of the panoply of intellectual property rights protecting innovations—there has been little empirical
1 William Molinski & Jacob M. Heath, Early Returns (Part 1 of 3): 3D Printing Company
Sues Under New Defend Trade Secrets Act, ORRICK BLOG: TRADE SECRETS WATCH (June 22,
2016), https://blogs.orrick.com/trade-secrets-watch/2016/06/22/early-returns-part-1-of-23d-printing-company-sues-under-new-defend-trade-secrets-act/.
2 See id.; infra note 167 and accompanying text (describing the DTSA). Magic Leap
also sued under California trade secret law. See Molinski & Heath, supra note 1.
3 David S. Almeling, Tracking Trade Secret Stats, LAW360 (Mar. 25, 2010), https://
www.law360.com/articles/156785/tracking-trade-secret-stats (“Trade secret cases doubled
in the seven years from 1988 to 1995, and doubled again in the nine years from 1995 to
2004. At their current rate, trade secret cases will double again by 2017.”); see also David S.
Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study of the First Year of
Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 124–25 (2018)
(finding 473 DTSA cases filed in federal courts from May 11, 2016, through May 11, 2017).

R
R
R
R
R
R
R

R
R
R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL206.txt

754

unknown

Seq: 4

notre dame law review

27-DEC-18

9:21

[vol. 94:2

study on what drives the use and effectiveness of trade secrets, unlike other
forms of intellectual property, such as patents.4 Of this small body of trade
secret research, very little has even mentioned technology startups.5 This is
perhaps even more surprising given that trade secrets are often viewed as a
vital mode of protection for a startup’s innovations that may “not otherwise
[be] protected by copyright or patent law.”6
In 2008, a team of researchers (including one of us) at UC Berkeley
performed a comprehensive study to better understand the role of patenting
among startups in the software, medical device, biotechnology, and information technology hardware industries.7 Indeed, one of the leading innovation
economists, Bronwyn Hall, refers to it as the “most comprehensive evidence
of start-up patenting.”8 Important for this Article, as part of that study, several questions compared patenting to secrecy.9 Although some limited
results regarding trade secrecy were published using this dataset,10 much of
the data as it relates to secrecy has been either underexplored or wholly
unexplored, including the economic relationship between patents and trade
secrets,11 the role of trade secrets in promoting first-mover advantage, and
4 See discussion infra Part II.
5 See discussion infra Section II.A.
6 Jonathan Rubens, Early-Stage IP Protection: A Primer and Overview for Working with the
Startup, BUS. L. TODAY., July 2016, at 1, 3, https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/
aba/publications/blt/2016/07/ip-protection-201607.authcheckdam.pdf; see also Michael
Risch, Hidden in Plain Sight, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1635, 1637–38 (2016) (contending that
where patents are unavailable, software companies even use trade secrecy to protect otherwise “visible program aspects” of their products); Patents or Trade Secrets?, WORLD INTELL.
PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/ip_business/trade_secrets/patent_trade.htm
(last visited Aug. 16, 2017) (“[T]rade secrets may concern inventions or manufacturing
processes that do not meet the patentability criteria and therefore can only be protected as
trade secrets.”); Tim Sewart, Five Common Legal Mistakes Startups Can Avoid, TECHWORLD
(June 8, 2017), http://www.techworld.com/startups/five-legal-terms-all-startups-needknow-about-3659899/ (“Experience tells us that the latter approach (secret; bid for market
share) is normally wiser than the former (patents; disclosure) but that businesses’ preoccupation with the former can often leave them mired in delay and cost. Of course, much will
depend on the nature of the business or product.”).
7 See Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent System:
Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1255, 1260, 1288 (2009).
8 Bronwyn Hall et al., The Choice Between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property: A Review 24 (March 2012) (unpublished draft) [hereinafter Hall et al., unpublished
draft], http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.299.4184&rep=rep1
&type=pdf. An updated version of the article was published two years later. Hall et al., The
Choice Between Formal and Informal Intellectual Property: A Review, 52 J. ECON. LITERATURE 375,
384 (2014) [hereinafter Hall et al., The Choice Between].
9 See discussion infra Part III.
10 See discussion infra Part II.
11 For instance, Hall and her coauthors specifically suggest that more research is warranted and that data from different settings could be helpful for testing “the assumption
that patents and secrecy are mutually exclusive and to consider a more complex and realistic scenario in which companies employ different mechanisms to protect the same invention.” Hall et al., The Choice Between, supra note 8, at 419.
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the use of trade secrets as strategic intellectual property (IP) assets.12
Indeed, after the publication of the Berkeley Patent Survey articles, leading
trade secret researcher Ivan Png, as a result of empirical study, called for a
“new research agenda—the impact of trade secrets law on (i) entrepreneurship and venture capital, (ii) collaboration, (iii) business and marketing
innovation, and (iv) international trade and investment.”13 This Article
addresses the first three of those items.
As such, this Article makes a significant contribution toward understanding these complex relationships, and thereby helps fill a meaningful void in
the literature. Specifically, we make three major theoretical and empirical
findings. First, trade secrecy may serve important aims other than extending
first-mover advantage.14 Second, trade secrets may act as both economic
complements and substitutes to patenting.15 Third, trade secrets may serve
as important strategic assets, functioning much in the same manner as patents in terms of licensing and setting the boundaries of the firm.16
Part I of this Article assesses the current theoretical views on the use of
trade secrets, applying them in the context of technology startups. Part II
then explores the existing empirical research regarding trade secrets, noting
the relative paucity of work focused on startups. Part III begins by describing
the Berkeley Patent Survey, including its methods and dataset. It then
presents the major results as they concern trade secrecy, first descriptively,
and then in the form of several regression models. Part IV assesses the
results, describing the study’s major implications for trade secrecy theory and
empirical research.
I. EXISTING THEORIES

WHY STARTUPS USE (AND DON’T USE)
TRADE SECRETS

OF

As noted earlier, the literature contains a variety of theories attempting
to explain why companies choose to use trade secrets (or not).17 Less prevalent are theories focused on startups.18 Here, in order to provide context for
our empirical study, we draw from the smaller literature on startups and
adapt from the larger, more general literature to present a theory as to why
startups use (and do not use) trade secrecy.19 We focus on a startup’s deci12 See discussion infra Part IV.
13 I.P.L. Png, Law and Innovation: Evidence from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 28
(March 2011) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.fas.nus.edu.sg/ecs/events/seminar/seminar-papers/12Apr11.pdf.
14 See discussion infra Section IV.A.
15 See discussion infra Section IV.B.
16 See discussion infra Section IV.C.
17 See discussion supra Introduction (describing several prominent theories of why
firms use trade secrets).
18 See discussion infra Sections I.A–B. (drawing primarily from studies focused on companies as a whole).
19 See discussion infra Sections I.A–B. (presenting a set of reasons as to why startups
use (and do not use) trade secrets).
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sion to choose trade secrecy as an appropriation mechanism in addition to
(i.e., as an economic “complement”) or in place of (i.e., as an economic “substitute”) to other forms of intellectual property and barriers to competition,
such as patents, copyrights, and lead-time advantages.20
A.

Reasons Why Startups Use Trade Secrecy

While patents and copyrights are mandated by the U.S. Constitution,21
the origins of trade secrecy trace to the common law.22 There are two core
elements for trade secret infringement under state law: “(1) the information
qualifies as a ‘trade secret,’ and (2) the defendant acquired, used, or disclosed the information in breach of confidence or by other improper
means.”23 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition has articulated a similar framework for trade secrecy.24 Trade secrecy applies to a range of information, including recipes,25 software code,26 customer lists,27 algorithms,28

20 N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 98 (7th ed. 2015) (“[S]ubstitutes are
goods that are typically used in place of one another, such as hamburgers and hot dogs. . . .
Conversely, complements are goods that are typically used together, such as computers and
software.”).
21 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
22 See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error
When They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 496 (2010)
(“For a variety of reasons . . . the evolution of trade secret law shifted from the crucible of
the courtroom and the common law process to the uniform lawmaking and legislative
processes.”).
23 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification,
86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 247 (1998).
24 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (AM. LAW INST. 1995) (defining
a “trade secret” as “any information that can be used in the operation of a business or
other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential
economic advantage over others”).
25 See generally Babak Zarin, Knead to Know: Cracking Recipes and Trade Secret Law, 8 ELON
L. REV. 183 (2016) (analyzing the evolution of the cooking industry standards in the context of copyright, patent, and trademark law).
26 See generally Mansi Shah, Is Your Code Protected? Courts Everywhere Are Finding Software
Patents Invalid, So What Next?, MEDIUM: STARTUP (Aug. 28, 2015), https://medium.com/
swlh/is-your-code-protected-70735e2e386 (discussing the invalidity of issued utility patents
on computer software).
27 Timothy K. Sendek, Customer Lists as Trade Secrets, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 30, 2009),
http://www.natlawreview.com/article/customer-lists-trade-secrets.
28 Geeta Daswani, Trade Secrets, Its Significance and a Comparative Analysis of Trade
Secret Protection in Different Jurisdictions 3 (Nov. 15, 2016) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2869715 (mentioning Google’s search algorithm as an example
of a trade secret).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL206.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 7

27-DEC-18

why do startups use trade secrets?

9:21

757

and other technical information.29 Perhaps the most well-known example of
the “best-kept trade secret[ ] in the world” is the recipe for Coca-Cola.30
1.

To Maintain Lead-Time Advantage and Prevent Competition

“Lead-time” or “first-mover” advantage occurs when a company enters
the market earlier than competitors, which often allows the company to
acquire a dominant market share for a particular product or service.31
Although startups can maintain a lead-time advantage simply because of the
inherent failure of competitors to innovate,32 a primary reason for choosing
trade secrecy is to extend a lead-time advantage by preventing the disclosure
of specific information that provides the advantage.33 For instance, to a large
degree, Google—an early pioneer in online search engines—has been able
to maintain its dominance by keeping key details of its search algorithms a
trade secret.34
Theoretical modeling supports this conclusion. For instance, Alexandra
Zaby has constructed an economic model that finds when a technological
first-mover advantage is large, inventors will often use secrecy in an effort to
29 Allen Dixon, Leading Practices to Protect Trade Secrets, WOLTERS KLUWER: KLUWER PAT.
BLOG (Nov. 1, 2016), http://kluwerpatentblog.com/2016/11/01/leading-practices-to-protect-trade-secrets.
30 Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Shreveport v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 289 (D. Del.
1985).
31 See NATHAN WAJSMAN & FRANCISCO GARCÍA-VALERO, EUR. UNION INTELLECTUAL PROP.
OFFICE, PROTECTING INNOVATION THROUGH TRADE SECRETS AND PATENTS: DETERMINANTS
FOR EUROPEAN UNION FIRMS 11 (2017) (“‘Lead time advantage’ is the practice to commercialise an innovation as fast as possible to benefit from so-called first-mover advantages.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 311, 330 (2008) (“[P]rotection for business ideas helps ensure a first-mover advantage for those who take risks on untested business models.”); Michael Risch, Why Do We
Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 22 (2007) (“[T]he value of a secret
process lies in its exclusivity; the ability of one person to use information and to keep
others from using it is exactly what gives the information a competitive advantage.”).
32 See Anthony Arundel, The Relative Effectiveness of Patents and Secrecy for Appropriation,
30 RES. POL’Y 611, 615 (2001) (surveying 2849 R&D performing firms and finding that lead
time is far more important than secrecy and patents).
33 See Francesco Castellaneta et al., Money Secrets: How Does Trade Secret Legal Protection
Affect Firm Market Value? Evidence from the Uniform Trade Secret Act, 38 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
834, 836 (2017) (“In today’s knowledge-based economy, competitive advantage depends
more and more on firms having and protecting valuable and rare proprietary information,
unknown to rivals.”); Pia Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Kaisu Puumalainen, Nature and Dynamics of Appropriability: Strategies for Appropriating Returns on Innovation, 37 R&D MGMT. 95, 106
(2007) (finding a positive relationship between seeking short-term value, the use of lead
time, and secrecy).
34 See WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 28 (“[T]he top three [protection]
mechanisms reported in most [EU] countries are first-mover advantages, complexity of
product and secrecy.”); Brenda M. Simon & Ted Sichelman, Data-Generating Patents, 111
NW. U. L. REV. 377, 382 (2017) (“Google’s use of its aggregated search data derived from
its patented search algorithms is . . . used to target customized advertising to users . . . to
improve the algorithms per se.”).
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extend the lead.35 Yet, the model also shows that when reverse engineering
is straightforward—such as in the pharmaceutical industry—companies will
tend to rely upon patents to protect a first-mover advantage.36
Beyond first-mover advantage for a single company, sometimes a small
number of incumbent companies may use trade secrets to maintain an oligopoly for a product or service merely by excluding potential competition.37
Here, the mechanism is similar to that of maintaining a first-mover advantage—by preventing third parties from obtaining critical information, the
incumbents enjoy supracompetitive profits flowing from the lack of
competition.38
2.

Patent Protection Is Unavailable

As just noted, sometimes patents are a better mechanism to maintain a
lead-time advantage or to prevent competition than trade secrets, particularly
when reverse engineering or independent invention is likely.39 However, in
many instances, patent protection is unavailable for an invention—for
instance, because it is too abstract or too obvious of an idea to be patenta-

35 See Alexandra K. Zaby, Losing the Lead: The Patenting Decision in the Light of the Disclosure Requirement, 19 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 147, 149 (2010) (“[If] the winner of
one R&D race decides to patent his invention, he loses his technological lead and consequently all firms face the same probability of success subsequently.”); cf. Klaus Kultti et al.,
Secrecy Versus Patenting, 38 RAND J. ECON. 22, 23 (2007) (arguing that innovators more
often are choosing not between secrecy and patenting, but between patenting and letting
the competition patent). See generally Michael Risch, Trade Secret Law and Information Development Incentives, in THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY 152 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss &
Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) (discussing the role of trade secrecy in the context of
other intellectual property rights).
36 See Zaby, supra note 35, at 160 (“In an industry sector with a high propensity to
patent, such as Pharmaceuticals, the easiness of reverse engineering is rather high so that
the effective headstart of an inventor is low.”).
37 See Katarzyna A. Czapracka, Antitrust and Trade Secrets: The U.S. and the EU Approach,
24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 207, 236 (2008) (“Licensing of trade secrets
(or know-how), just as patent licensing, is generally pro-competitive; it allows dissemination
of technology and its fuller exploitation. . . . But the license can also be a mere sham to
cover price fixing or territory sharing between competitors.”).
38 See WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 10 (“[E]ntrepreneurs expect supernormal profits by enjoying some kind of exclusive market power over their inventions.”);
Douglas C. Lippoldt & Mark F. Schultz, Uncovering Trade Secrets—An Empirical Assessment of
Economic Implications of Protection for Undisclosed Data 8 (OECD Trade Policy Papers, No. 167,
2014) (“A further incentivising effect noted in the literature is the role that trade secrets
may play in conferring competitive benefits. . . . [F]irms may invest in developing trade
secrets because the prospect of supra-competitive profits motivates them to do so.”).
39 See Zaby, supra note 35.
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ble.40 Thus, another important reason for using trade secrecy is as a substitute for patent protection.41
Historically, perceived patent unavailability has been exacerbated by the
“legal uncertainty” surrounding the availability of patent protection, which
drives firms to trade secrecy.42 Additionally, a perceived inability to reduce
an innovation to writing can also be a hindrance.43 By contrast, trade secrecy
requires no administrative hurdles and no reduction to writing; one either
meets the standard or one does not, and no administrative agency ever
decides whether those elements are met.44
40 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 103 (2012) (putting forth the rules for unpatentability of obvious and abstract inventions); see also Risch, supra note 31, at 12 (“Unlike a patent, information need not be unique, novel, or non-obvious to be protected.”).
41 EUROPEAN COMM’N, STUDY ON TRADE SECRETS AND CONFIDENTIAL BUSINESS INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET 124 (2013) [hereinafter EUR. COMM’N , Study on Trade
Secrets], http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/iprenforcement/docs/trade-secrets/
130711_final-study_en.pdf (“The second most important reason . . . [why businesses rely
on trade secrets rather than on other intellectual property rights] is the lack of eligibility
(30% [positive responses]).”).
42 See Serge Pajak, Do Innovative Firms Rely on Big Secrets? An Analysis of IP Protection
Strategies with the CIS 4 Survey, 25 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 516, 528 (2016) (“The
notion that firms tend to prefer secrecy to protect their innovations because of the legal
uncertainty surrounding IP rights has been suspected for long and has led to several patent
system reform propositions.”); see also James J. Anton & Dennis A. Yao, Little Patents and Big
Secrets: Managing Intellectual Property, 35 RAND J. ECON. 1, 1 (2004) (“Surveys of U.S. firms
found that a substantial fraction of patentable inventions were not patented (Mansfield,
1986) and that secrecy was viewed as more important than patenting for appropriability
(Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh, 2000).”); Josh Lerner, Using Litigation to Understand Trade
Secrets: A Preliminary Exploration 3 (Aug. 7, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=922520&rec=1&srcabs=1090933&alg=1&pos
=53 (noting that firms should keep important discoveries secret, especially where enforcement of property rights is limited). Indeed, not understanding patent law or the patent
option can itself drive firms to secrecy. See Christian Helmers & Mark Rogers, Does Patenting Help High-Tech Start-Ups?, 40 RES. POL’Y 1016, 1026 (2011) (“[A] substantial lack of
understanding of the IP system particularly among small companies . . . may explain why
the proportion of patentees is low.”). Lerner noted that firms that have little experience
dealing with “formal” protections, or that infrequently innovate, will use secrecy over patents. Lerner, supra, at 5 (noting firms that “have little experience with seeking formal
protection” or “that innovate infrequently may consequently eschew [formal] protection,
and rely instead on trade secrecy”); see also David D. Friedman et al., Some Economics of
Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 61, 64 (1991) (“The Patent Office correctly refuses the
patent—and the inventor correctly uses trade secret protection instead.”).
43 See Nuria González-Álvarez & Mariano Nieto-Antolı́n, Appropriability of Innovation
Results: An Empirical Study in Spanish Manufacturing Firms, 27 TECHNOVATION 280, 284
(2007) (“Codification of knowledge refers to the fact that knowledge may be converted
into information using formulas, diagrams, numbers or words. . . . The patent system is,
therefore, more effective when protecting [explicit or codified] knowledge.”); id.
(“[P]rotecting tacit knowledge, which is impossible to patent as it cannot be reduced to
information, requires the use of industrial secret as a defence mechanism.”).
44 See David S. Levine, Secrecy and Unaccountability: Trade Secrets in Our Public Infrastructure, 59 FLA. L. REV. 135, 156–57 (2007) (noting the “infinite duration” of Coca-Cola’s
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Perceived lack of patentability has been heightened especially for
software, business method, and biotechnology inventions after the U.S.
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc.,45 Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc.,46 and
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International,47 driving many innovators, including
startups, away from patents and toward trade secrecy.48 Although the effects
of these cases are still in flux, it is safe to assume that software and biotechnology startups will veer toward trade secrecy until there is more clarity about
the Mayo-Myriad-Alice standard of patent eligibility.49
While the Mayo-Alice standard has erected a “not welcome” sign for
many software and biotechnology inventions, trade secrecy welcomes the
same inventions with open arms.50 Specifically, trade secret protection is
available for information that is not generally known to those in the industry,
is capable of adding economic value to the secret holder, and is subject to
reasonable precautions under the circumstances to prevent its disclosure.51
This means that the eligible subject matter for trade secrets has a much wider
formula, maintained as a trade secret rather than patent of limited duration, because CocaCola was able to continually meet the elements of a trade secret).
45 566 U.S. 66, 73 (2012) (“[T]he steps in the claimed processes (apart from the natural laws themselves) involve well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously
engaged in by researchers in the field.”).
46 569 U.S. 576, 580 (2013) (holding that Myriad Genetics’s patents on naturally
occurring isolated DNA sequences are invalid because “a naturally occurring DNA segment
is a product of nature and not patent eligible”).
47 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2352 (2014) (“[M]erely requiring generic computer implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”).
48 See Ryan Davis, Wave of USPTO Alice Rejections Has Cos. Tweaking Strategies, LAW360
(Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/720762/wave-of-uspto-alice-rejectionshas-cos-tweaking-strategies (quoting Brian Emfinger, who said that “Alice really changed
the game and set the bar and the standard much higher”); Seth Northrop, Software and
Trade Secrets: Rethinking IP Strategies After CLS v. Alice, JDSUPRA (June 30, 2014), https://
www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/software-and-trade-secrets-rethinking-i-15738/ (“As a result
[of the Supreme Court’s decision in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International], software innovators may find that, in some cases, trade secret law now offers the best method for protecting proprietary software advancements.”).
49 See Robert W. Esmond et al., A Best Kept Secret: AIA Allows Patenting of Trade Secrets,
BLOOMBERG BNA (Feb. 12, 2016), http://www.bloomberglaw.com/exp/eyJpZCI6Ik
EwSDhXNlc0UDc/anM9MCZzdWJzY3JpcHRpb250eXBlPWJuYXB0ZCZpc3N1ZT0y
MDE2MDIxMCZjYW1wYWlnb (“Increased market competition and recent Supreme Court
decisions limiting subject matter patent eligibility have caused many companies to question
whether they should file for patent protection, rely on trade secret protection, or both.”).
50 See Simon & Sichelman, supra note 34, 411–12 (“The Court adopted a similar rationale in Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, where it applied the Mayo test to abstract ideas,
and like Mayo, called into question the patentability of a large class of inventions, here
software.”).
51 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 317 (“A trade secret claim can be broken down into
three essential elements.”).
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scope than patents,52 covering business plans, customer lists, so-called “negative know-how,” and certainly software53 and biotechnology inventions.54
The America Invents Act (AIA) is another substantive change in patent
law that potentially makes trade secrecy more attractive.55 These changes
potentially narrow the scope of prior art to include only what is available to
the public and may even allow the patenting of trade secrets years after they
have been exploited commercially.56 Although one initial decision of the
Federal Circuit casts some doubt on whether the courts will interpret the AIA
in such a manner, these possibilities still remain open questions.57
3.

Patent Protection Is Too Costly, Weak, or Difficult to Enforce

Startups “may be subject to a different cost-benefit scheme when deciding to file for a patent.”58 Obtaining and asserting patents is expensive,59
52 See WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 14 (“[T]he range of information
that can be kept as a trade secret is indeed much broader by definition.”).
53 See id. at 35 tbl.6 (showing how the “[m]anufacture of computer, electronic and
optical products” industry has one of the highest trade secret use percentages (76.9%)).
54 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 331 (explaining the subject matter limitation of patent
law for a firm’s valuable information); Levine, supra note 44, at 155 (“[V]irtually all information that may, in some more than trivial way, have any value to a company could qualify
as a trade secret.”); see also WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 13 (“Commercial
trade secrets may consist of customer and supplier lists, business methods and strategies,
and cost and price information.”).
55 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.) (enacting amendments to the Patent
Act that are favorable to trade secret holders); Edward D. Manzo, The Impact of the America
Invents Act on Trade Secrets, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 497, 501 (2014) (“[O]ne
must now ask whether the AIA changed the balance between trade secret law and patent
law and what the new relationship will be between these different approaches to protecting
technology.”).
56 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2012) (“[T]he claimed invention was patented, described
in a printed publication, or in public use, on sale, or otherwise available to the public before
the effective filing date of the claimed invention . . . .”) (emphasis added); Manzo, supra
note 55, at 501 (“The PTO concluded that the revised defense has no direct impact on
trade secret law and that a prior user (whether the use is secret or not) who meets the
statutory provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 273 can continue to practice the subject matter despite a
later patent that the user otherwise would infringe.”).
57 Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 855 F.3d 1356, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2017) (“[A]fter the AIA, if the existence of the sale is public, the details of the invention
need not be publicly disclosed in the terms of sale.”), cert granted, 138 S. Ct. 2678 (2018).
58 Ted Sichelman & Stuart J.H. Graham, Patenting by Entrepreneurs: An Empirical Study,
17 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 111, 117 (2010); see also WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO,
supra note 31, at 32 (showing figures indicating that large innovating companies tend to
use trade secrets at a much higher percentage than small- and medium-sized enterprises).
59 See Aija Leiponen & Justin Byma, If You Cannot Block, You Better Run: Small Firms,
Cooperative Innovation, and Appropriation Strategies, 38 RES. POL’Y 1478, 1486 (2009)
(“[P]atents are too expensive to originate and defend for many small firms.”).
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and dealing with patent challenges can be equally cost prohibitive.60 Alternatively, trade secret protection vests almost immediately after meeting three
essential requirements,61 does not require an attorney to ensure protection,
and requires no filing fees.62 Patent litigation can also cost as much as three
times as much as trade secret litigation—with “a median of $5 million per
side in legal fees for large cases.”63 A major factor for startups, the cost of
obtaining a patent, will depend on the technology, claims, and patent prosecutor, but can range from $10,000 to $50,000,64 and maintenance fees in the
United States alone cost roughly $3000 to $13,000, depending on how large
the startup is over the life of the patent.65
Trade secrets, on the other hand, include the expense of sufficient precautions, such as nondisclosure agreements, installation of physical safeguards, and the expense of litigation66 in the event precautions fail.67
Nonetheless, these costs will generally be less than obtaining, defending, and
asserting patents.68 Therefore, minor inventions may not be worth the cost
of obtaining a patent.69
60 See Lerner, supra note 42, at 4 (“Firms with less capital market access may rely on
trade secrecy rather than on formal forms of intellectual property protection that may be
subject to costly challenges.”).
61 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 317 (“A trade secret claim can be broken down into
three essential elements.”).
62 See id. at 313 (“[Trade secrecy] is cheaper and quicker to obtain, since it doesn’t
require government approval . . . .”); Risch, supra note 31, at 36 (“[T]rade secrets are
much cheaper to obtain and do not grant the absolute exclusive right that patents do.”).
63 Lemley, supra note 31, at 331 (explaining why small companies view trade secrecy as
more cost-effective); see also Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1315 (“Startups may be particularly sensitive to accusations of infringement because they are likely to experience resource
constraints when faced with the costs of funding a suit, estimated for most suits to be
between $3 million and $6 million per litigant through appeal.”).
64 See Derek E. Bambauer, Secrecy is Dead—Long Live Trade Secrets, 93 DENV. L. REV. 833,
836 (2016) (“[T]wo 2013 surveys estimate the prosecution cost for a moderately complex
patent at roughly $10,000.”); Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1311 (“[T]he average out-ofpocket cost for a respondent firm to acquire its most recent patent was over $38,000.”).
65 See USPTO Fee Schedule, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, https://www.uspto.gov/
learning-and-resources/fees-and-payment/uspto-fee-schedule#Patent%20Maintenance
%20Fee (last updated Oct. 1, 2018).
66 See Castellaneta et al., supra note 33, at 836 (discussing how the number of trade
secret theft cases doubled between 1988 and 1995, and doubled again between 1995 and
2004, with the expectation of it doubling again in 2017).
67 See Bambauer, supra note 64, at 836 (posing examples for precautions taken by
companies to protect their secrets).
68 See Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1262 (“[T]he costs of prosecuting and enforcing
patents are a substantial barrier to technology entrepreneurs attempting to access the patent system.”).
69 See Josh Lerner, An Introduction to Patents and Trade Secrets, (Harvard Bus. Sch., Background Note No. 295-062, 2006), http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=
7559 (“[T]he innovation may be relatively minor, and hence the cost of filing and prosecuting an application may exceed the benefit of patent protection.”); see also González-
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Startups may view patents as particularly unattractive, as they have “fewer
revenue streams to protect or production costs to cut, which can make the
benefit of a patent seem remote.”70 In this regard, Anthony Arundel speculates that small firms, except those in the high-technology fields, are less
likely to develop patentable inventions, and instead generate incremental
improvements that are not worth patenting, but that are potentially protectable by trade secrecy.71 Further, “because startups may be [research and
development] specialists—doing less sales and marketing in their early life—
they may invent a diverse set of potential and not yet marketable products in
a short period of time.”72
Patents are simply not an adequate substitute for startups that do not
have the same financial backing as larger, more established firms.73 Thus, it
has been argued that an important goal of trade secrecy is, paradoxically, for
“businesses to spend less money protecting secret information.”74 Professor
Michael Risch argues that “[b]y allowing the creator exclusive use, the creator can more readily recoup [the] cost[ ] of creation.”75
4.

To Provide Protection Prior to and Complementary with Patenting

Although patents and trade secrets are often considered mutually exclusive substitutes,76 they are often used as complementary77 strategies, espeÁlvarez & Nieto-Antolı́n, supra note 43, at 285 (noting that innovations based on “minor
incremental improvements” are not worth patenting).
70 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 117 (citing Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Industry?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 985 (2005)).
71 See Arundel, supra note 32, at 613 (“[M]any small firms, with the exception of those
that are pursuing a high-technology strategy, could be less likely than large firms to
develop patentable innovations. Instead, many of their innovations could be based on
minor incremental improvements that are not worth patenting.”); see also Joshua S. Gans &
Scott Stern, Endogenous Appropriability, 107 AM. ECON. REV. 317, 321 (2017) (“[The]
appropriability regime governing an innovation depends not only on the instruments available to an innovator to protect private returns, but how those instruments interact with
each other as part of the firm’s entrepreneurial strategy.”).
72 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 117; see also WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO,
supra note 31, at 35 (showing how the “[s]cientific research” industry has the highest percentage for the use of trade secrets (79.3%) in the forty-six industries listed for EU
countries).
73 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 331 (discussing why startups “rely heavily on the incentive to invent provided by trade secret law”).
74 Risch, supra note 31, at 5. But cf. Levine, supra note 44, at 152, 180 (noting that
particularly in industries like public infrastructures (i.e., voting machines), trade secrecy
may encourage more secrecy at the expense of public knowledge and access).
75 Risch, supra note 31, at 27. On the other hand, startups may engage in patent for
signaling, defensive, or other strategic reasons, and in some instances, these secondary
benefits may offset the higher costs of patenting. See Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58,
at 120–30 (examining these secondary reasons to patent by startups).
76 See Gans & Stern, supra note 71, at 317 (“[There is an] interplay between control
and execution as alternative routes to appropriability.”).
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cially for large portfolios of intellectual property.78 First, a strong trade
secret protection program is often important during the “early stages of
development . . . [to] protect information that offers a competitive advantage.”79 During this development phase, a startup typically determines
whether the idea is ready for commercialization and whether a new method
of protection, such as patents, might be needed.80
This is especially so for incremental innovation among startups, where
the value of the innovation may be relatively small, and significant time is
needed to assess whether more costly protection, such as patenting, is warranted.81 Thus, keeping information secret in the research and development
(R&D) stage is a particularly strong reason for startups to use trade secrecy,
especially if the trade secret is the firm’s sole asset.82 Of course, the damage
to a startup from losing valuable R&D trade secrets to a competitor—like, for
example, losing the core trade secret when the R&D vice president steals
them and brings them to a larger competitor—can be profound.83 Thus,
startups must invest in robust protection programs.
77 See WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 53 (“[C]omplementarity used here
really refers to common adoption of trade secrets and patents.”).
78 See infra Part II (discussing empirical evidence that suggests that patents are not an
effective tool in most industries, especially not taken alone).
79 Esmond et al., supra note 49, at 4.
80 See id. (positing important questions for firms to address when deciding to file for
patent protection); see also WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 17 (“Firms may
also combine patenting and secrecy in a way that enables them to keep the codified part of
an invention secret, whilst maintaining the option of later patenting the invention.”).
81 See EUR. COMM’N, Study on Trade Secrets, supra note 41, at 2 (“With specific focus on
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), trade secrets appear of particular importance
because innovation in this segment tends to be more incremental in nature . . . .”);
WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 14 (“[Trade secrecy] applies to innovation in
the early stages of [the] innovative process.”).
82 See Heidi Olander et al., What’s Small Size Got to Do with It? Protection of Intellectual
Assets in SMEs, 13 INT’L J. INNOVATION MGMT. 349, 357 (2009) (“[I]t can be assumed that
the protection is targeted more on protecting existing knowledge assets—and thus premises for future innovation—than on protecting innovation output.”). In this regard,
stricter rules that require disclosure prior to patent issuance may benefit larger firms
rather than startups, because the large firms are more likely to have the funds to obtain a
patent. See id. at 356 (“[N]ew disclosure rules benefiting bigger firms may be disadvantageous to SMEs as they force them to expose the details of their inventions before the
patents have been granted . . . .”). However, Stuart Graham and Deepak Hegde note that
despite the seeming benefits of electing not to publish prior to patent issuance for small
companies—which is feasible for firms that only file in the United States—very few elect it.
See Stuart Graham & Deepak Hedge, Disclosing Patents’ Secrets, 347 SCI. 236, 236 (2015)
(“All inventor types are much more likely to choose pregrant disclosure over secrecy (SM).
Conditional on U.S.-only patenting, small U.S. inventors prefer pregrant disclosure, and
are no more likely than large U.S. entities to select secrecy (16.9% versus 16.4% . . . ).”).
83 See, e.g., Joe Carlson, Medical Device Executive Pleads Guilty to Stealing Trade Secrets,
STAR TRIB. (May 9, 2017), http://www.startribune.com//medical-device-executive-pleadsguilty-to-stealing-trade-secrets/421793043/ (noting that the defendant, who pled guilty to
a criminal charge of trade secret misappropriation, “was vice president of research and
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Similarly, trade secrecy can work in tandem with existing patents.84 For
instance, IP and lead time can be complementary,85 and startups may “protect innovations by concentrating on safeguarding innovative input, rather
than innovations as output.”86 This concept ties in with the complementary
strategy analysis described earlier, especially as biotechnology and software
startups look for opportunities to sell or license to firms that will market their
trade secret.87 Indeed, innovation can be protected by both a “product patent” and a “process trade secret,” and are therefore complements, although a
single bit of knowledge cannot be protected by both a patent and trade
secret.88
Moreover, even for pure product patents, it is often possible in practice
to withhold key details of the invention, yet still obtain patent protection.89
Related, a firm may improve an existing patented invention, maintaining the
improvement as a trade secret.90 In this regard, there is no obligation for
patent holders to continuously update their patent disclosures as they
development at Lutonix from 2007 to 2015, a position that gave him access to the company’s proprietary designs for drug-coated balloons”).
84 See WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 14 (“[Trade secrets] may be used
in combination with other IP protection mechanisms to protect complex
innovations . . . .”).
85 See WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 8 (“Innovating firms often use both
patents and trade secrets to protect their innovations . . . .”); Heidi Olander et al., Reasons
for Choosing Mechanisms to Protect Knowledge and Innovations, 52 MGMT. DECISION 207, 213
(2014) (“[I]nformal and formal mechanisms . . . may also be complementary (e.g. IPRs
and lead time).”).
86 Olander et al., supra note 82, at 366.
87 See Czapracka, supra note 37, at 217 (“[S]ecret know-how concerning the implementation of a patented invention is often licensed with patents, which indicates that there
is some level of symbiosis between patents and know-how.”).
88 Marcus Holgersson, Patent Management in Entrepreneurial SMEs: A Literature Review
and an Empirical Study of Innovation Appropriation, Patent Propensity, and Motives, 43 R&D
MGMT. 21, 25 (2013) (“[A]n innovation can be protected by both a product patent and a
process trade secret, and that patents and trade secrets therefore are not mutually exclusive but rather important complements. Nevertheless, it can be argued that each single bit
of knowledge cannot be protected by both a patent (which requires information disclosure) and a trade secret (which requires information nondisclosure).”); see also WAJSMAN &
GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 17 (“[F]irms may also choose to mix both strategies at the
level of individual innovations by protecting some elements of a technology through patents and keeping others secret . . . .”).
89 See WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 20 (“Graham (2004) argues that
firms may keep the codified part of an invention secret, while maintaining the option to
later patent the invention.”); Simon & Sichelman, supra note 34, at 377 (“[B]ecause the
patent disclosure requirements are not always rigorous, inventors may sometimes be able
to keep certain aspects of an invention secret, yet still receive a patent to the invention as a
whole.”).
90 See Bone, supra note 23, at 265 (“[T]he economic goal is to internalize just enough
of the social value so that prospective inventors will invest optimally in creative activity
given the social costs.”).
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improve the underlying invention.91 In yet another strategy, firms that can
patent so called data-generating inventions obtain a patent on a process or
system that generates data, then retain the data as a trade secret, often effectively extending the twenty-year term of the underlying patent.92 All of these
strategies underscore that patents and trade secrets are not always substitutes
for one another, even after patent issuance, contrary to the preponderance
of existing empirical literature.93
5.

To Assist in Financing and Financial Exit

Holding patents can assist startups in obtaining financing and improving
the possibility and quality of an acquisition or initial public offering.94 Similarly, one can hypothesize that maintaining trade secrets—namely, valuable
information that is sufficiently protected to be afforded trade secret protection—can benefit financing and financial exit.95 When a startup’s managing
partner has a strong customer list, the big names on the list may encourage
others to back the budding startup.96 Another prime example is a secret for
the process of making goods at a lower cost, allowing the startup to spend a
great deal less to produce twice as many of the same goods as a competing
company.97 An investor’s access to this information would encourage financial backing on the front end, and a possibly lucrative financial exit on the
back end.98 Therefore, knowledge (or lack thereof) can impact whether an
investor will choose to invest in and/or acquire a startup.
However, one major difference between patents and trade secrets is that
because patents are eventually public documents, one can argue that they
serve a signaling function—namely, identifying the value of technological
91 See, e.g., Simon & Sichelman, supra note 34, at 383 (“[I]nventors are under no duty
to update their disclosures after they file for a patent application.”).
92 See id. at 379 (“Even after the patent term ends, the data-generating patent holder
may continue to benefit from the de jure lead time advantage secured by the prior patent
in its compilation of data.”).
93 See id. at 384 (“Patents and trade secrets are traditionally considered economic substitutes . . . . However, a handful of scholars have recognized that patents and trade secrets
may sometimes act as economic complements, because patent law does not always require
full disclosure of the invention.”).
94 See Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1303 (“[P]atents play an important role in the
financing of many startup companies, both during the initial stages and subsequent development of the firm, and also at the liquidity or exit event.”); Sichelman & Graham, supra
note 58, at 113 (“[S]tartup and early-stage companies seek[ ] to use patents to attract
financing and to improve their chances of being acquired or going public.”).
95 See Levine, supra note 44, at 139 (“[T]he use of secrecy as a core business tool is
increasing in use and importance.”); Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 166 (“[Firms]
use . . . patents to secure capital and improve exits . . . .”).
96 See Risch, supra note 31, at 28 (“Knowing who to contact will reduce costs of sales vis
a vis a company’s competitors.”).
97 See id. (“Producers compete with other food and widget makers, and they still have
price competition.”).
98 See id. (discussing how trade secrets must have a competitive value, and cost reduction is one of them).
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assets—that may not be served by trade secrets.99 Thus, to the extent that
the benefit to startups of holding patents for financing and exit is driven by
signaling value, then trade secrets may not afford these benefits.100 On the
other hand, there are strong arguments that patents assist financing and exits
beyond mere signaling value, and to the extent trade secrets serve many of
the same nonsignaling functions as patents, then presumably trade secrets
would also benefit startups in these financial events.101
6.

To Prevent Employees from Working at Competitors

Startups are often faced with key employees wishing to depart for a competitor or to form a new company.102 A noncompetition agreement, which
prevents employees from working at a competitor for a specified period of
time after termination or resignation, is the primary mechanism to stem this
leakage of “human capital.”103 Where enforced, they can be very effective at
preventing employees from working for a competitor.
However, in a few states, noncompetition agreements are precluded by
law, at least in certain situations, or are subject to various limitations.104 In
these states, trade secrets and patents can be used to mimic the preclusive
effects of noncompetition agreements by creating significant penalties for
bringing proprietary information to a new employer.105 Specifically, if an
99 See Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 642 (2002) (“[T]he signaling
value to the patentee may be the extra capital it is able to raise in capital markets because
of the information conveyed by the patent.”).
100 See Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1306 (“It is widely held that VC investors rely on
patents in their investment decisions . . . .”); see also Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at
161 (“[T]his finding may support the view that investor sentiment is primarily driven by
patents’ signaling qualities.”).
101 See Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1306–07 (“[P]atents tend to provide sufficient
freedom to operate, allowing a company to develop and commercialize its embryonic
products. . . . [And allow the investors] to enjoy these IP rights as residual claimants should
the venture fail.”).
102 See generally Lemley, supra note 31, at 315 (discussing how the circumstances in
which an employee may continue her business after departing her employer is still debated
today).
103 WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 15 (“[Trade secrets] require explicit
non-disclosure and not-compete clauses in employee contracts which may inhibit
employee mobility or trigger payment of indemnification if enforceable . . . .”); Viva R.
Moffat, Making Non-Competes Unenforceable, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 939, 940 (2012) (defining “noncompetition agreements” as “agreements by employees not to compete with their employers following the termination of employment”); see also Castellaneta et al., supra note 33, at
838 (discussing how fear of trade secret misappropriation constrains the amount of knowledge a former employee can transfer to a new employer).
104 See Jonathan M. Barnett & Ted M. Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in Innovation
Markets (USC Law Legal Studies Research Papers Series No. 16-15, 2016), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758854 (“[S]everal state legislatures have
enacted laws or are considering enacting laws to prohibit or restrict noncompetes.”).
105 See id. at 9 (“A firm may use patents to protect against knowledge leakage through
employee movement . . . .”).
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employee seeks to depart to a competitor or to form a new company, but the
information in the employee’s possession cannot legally be put into practice,
it will in principle provide a strong incentive for the employee to remain at
the current employer.106 Thus, although there is some debate about
whether patents or trade secrets are more effective in this role,107 there is no
doubt that trade secrecy can serve such a purpose and thus help promote the
esprit de corps of a well-run startup (as compared to the use of typically more
restrictive noncompetition agreements).108
7.

To Generate Licensing Revenues

Typically, licensing of technological inventions occurs via the licensing
of patents.109 In this instance, a license generally provides a third party a
right to make, use, or sell the patented invention in return for a fee.110
Because the invention being licensed is disclosed in a patent, a prospective
licensor generally can disclose the invention to a prospective licensee as part
of the initial licensing offer without fear that the invention will be used
absent remuneration.111 Either the prospective licensee pays for its use via a
license, or in the event the licensee uses the invention without authorization,
106 See id. (“A patenting strategy converts any departing employee into an encumbered
asset that is less attractive to competitors, will receive lower offers from competitors, and
can therefore be retained at a lower cost.”); Castellaneta et al., supra note 33, at 838 (“[I]n
over 75 percent of trade secret cases in U.S. state courts and over half the cases in U.S.
federal courts, the alleged misappropriator was a former employee . . . .”).
107 Compare Emilie-Pauline Gallié & Diégo Legros, French Firms’ Strategies for Protecting
Their Intellectual Property, 41 RES. POL’Y 780, 782–83 (2012) (“Analysing the link between
human resource practices and the choice between patenting and secrecy . . . the introduction of strategies to secure employee loyalty (in other words, to reduce job mobility) leads
to greater use of trade secrets than patents.”), with Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi Alberto
Franzoni, Patents, Secrets, and the First-Inventor Defense, 13 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 517,
537 (2004) (“[C]ertain industries—for instances, those in which the risk of leakage is lowest—prefer to rely on secrecy.”).
108 See, e.g., Gallié & Legros, supra note 107, at 785 (“This strategy of non-statutory
means of protection also requires the development of employee loyalty. And indeed, these
firms do develop human resources strategies to retain employees.”).
109 See Robin Cooper Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean
Innovation?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 137, 139 (2015) (“It is the technology being sold; the patents
accompany the sale of the technology.”).
110 See generally Yuichi Watanabe, Comment, Patent Licensing and the Emergence of a New
Patent Market, 9 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L.J. 445, 463–64 (2009) (explaining that the patentee
can forgo the exclusivity to make, use, and sell the invention in the patent in exchange for
a license fee).
111 See Michael J. Burstein, Exchanging Information Without Intellectual Property, 91 TEX. L.
REV. 227, 229 (2012) (“If information is subject to a patent or a copyright, then it can be
disclosed without fear that it will be taken without compensation.”); Sichelman & Graham,
supra note 58, at 129 (“Because a patent can often prevent copying by third parties, a
patent may effectively serve as a non-negotiable form of non-disclosure agreement (NDA),
usually protected by broad injunctive relief.”).
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it pays for its use in a patent infringement action (assuming the patent is
valid).112
Indeed, Kenneth Arrow postulated that patents can solve what has been
dubbed the “information disclosure paradox—namely, that in order for the
holder of value information to sell it to another party, it must disclose the
information to that party, but once the information is disclosed, the other
party can expropriate it without any legal repercussions.113 Patents help to
overcome the paradox by providing the discloser of the information a legal
cause of action against the recipient who uses it without authorization.114
Trade secret protection, on the other hand, would not provide such protection in theory, because all protection is vitiated as soon as the information is
voluntarily disclosed to a third party not under an obligation to maintain the
information as a secret.115 Of course, the holder of the information can
attempt to secure a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) with the recipient, but
many potential licensees refuse to sign such agreements for fear of a lawsuit
over information the recipient already possessed.116
However, Michael Burstein has cast doubt on the traditional theory of
information disclosure—and, in turn, the bite of Arrow’s information disclosure paradox—because he explains that in many transactions, information
can be disclosed in seriatim, like the layers of an onion being peeled back, so
as to reveal the most valuable information only after lengthy discussion and
negotiation.117 When information can be disclosed in this fashion, trade
secret law still plays a critical role by protecting the core of the most valuable
information from being expropriated absent remuneration.118 Thus, if the
recipient agrees to be bound by a confidentiality agreement, or if informa112 See Michael Risch, Licensing Acquired Patents, 21 GEO. MASON L. REV. 979, 985 (2014)
(“Some patent owners, including acquirers, might recount how they approached potential
licensees but were rejected, and how they later had to sue for infringement.”).
113 Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 615 (1962) (explaining that “[i]n the absence of special
legal protection,” “[a]ny one purchaser can destroy the monopoly, since he can reproduce
the information at little or no cost”); see also WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at
11 (“[R]ivals could free ride on the innovation expenses of the innovators and imitate the
new product/process at zero cost.”).
114 See Arrow, supra note 113, at 615 (“With suitable legal measures, information may
become an appropriable commodity.”).
115 See Risch, supra note 31, at 3 (discussing how it is more difficult for owners of trade
secrets to easily stop others from using them).
116 See Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 129–30 (“[C]ommercial partners may
refuse to sign the NDA contract.”).
117 Burstein, supra note 111, at 235 (“[Information] is a multilayered, continuous asset
that can simultaneously communicate value in different ways.”).
118 See id. at 255 (“More particularly, different types of information about a particular
intellectual product may be relevant in different circumstances and contexts of exchange.
Information is heterogeneous.”).
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tion can be disclosed in seriatim, trade secrets can function much like patents in aiding licensing transactions.119
8.

To Provide Strategic Bargaining Leverage

To the extent that trade secrets can enhance the prospects of licensing,
they may in turn offer leverage in strategic bargaining with potential partners.120 For example, when two companies agree to cross-license their intellectual property and related rights, some of those rights may be covered by
trade secrets rather than patents or copyrights.121 The ability to protect otherwise unprotected information assets by trade secrets would in theory
increase the bargaining power of the trade secret holder in these types of
negotiations, because it would lend value to the information—via legal sanctions—that it would otherwise not enjoy.122 Indeed, consistent with such a
view, one scholar theorizes that knowledge leakage decreases bargaining
power and increases new competitors.123
B.
1.

Reasons for Startups Not to Use Trade Secrecy

Ease of Reverse Engineering and Advantages to Patenting

Because trade secrets can legally be discovered through reverse engineering, they are often difficult to enforce compared to patents.124
Although trade secrecy potentially lasts forever, while patents only last about
twenty years, if it is relatively easy to discover a secret through reverse engi119 See id. at 235 (discussing how information-flow design overcomes the disclosure
paradox).
120 See generally Castellaneta et al., supra note 33, at 845 (discussing that stronger tradesecrecy protection generates a net increase in the firm market value in industries with
higher knowledge-worker mobility); James D. Hamilton & William E. Beaumont, Licensing
Patents and Trade Secrets, OBLON (June 2000), http://www.oblon.com/publications/licensing-patents-and-trade-secrets/ (stating that an advantage of trade secret licensing is the
ability to leverage business resources).
121 See Czapracka, supra note 37, at 217 (“[S]ecret know-how concerning the implementation of a patented invention is often licensed with patents, which indicates that there
is some level of symbiosis between patents and know-how.”).
122 See id. (“Trade secrets can be used to protect inventions that are not patentable or
those in which the length or other conditions of patent protection are inadequate.”).
123 See Paavo Ritala et al., Knowledge Sharing, Knowledge Leaking and Relative Innovation
Performance: An Empirical Study, 35 TECHNOVATION 22, 24 (2015) (“[Knowledge leakage]
decreases bargaining power and even creates new competitors for the original knowledge
owner.”); see also Lemley, supra note 31, at 313 (stating that trade secret law was developed
to stop knowledge leakage and to prevent new competitors from acquiring their
information).
124 See Trade Secrets, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/
www/sme/en/documents/pdf/ip_panorama_4_learning_points.pdf (last visited Aug. 19,
2017) (“A trade secret cannot be protected against being discovered by fair and honest
means, such as by independent invention or reverse engineering. . . . A trade secret is
difficult to enforce, as the level of protection is considerably weaker than for patents.”).
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neering, then patents may be preferable.125 Additionally, “trade secret law
protects only against those who procure the information through improper
means or who are in specified relationships with a misappropriator,” whereas
patents may be enforced against direct infringers, regardless of the
infringer’s intention.126
To a large degree, the ease with which reverse engineering may be
achieved depends on the complexity of the underlying information.127 For
instance, in software, a skilled programmer can often view a product’s functionality and design it.128 On the other hand, code itself is more difficult,
and in some cases impossible, to reverse engineer, making trade secrecy a
more attractive option.129 Thus, in a broader sense, there is often a greater
risk to a company of losing “codified technology” than technology that is not
yet fully developed.130 In sum, to the extent that any putative trade secret
could be reverse engineered, trade secrecy should be cautiously used.131
2.

Fear of Others Independently Patenting the Invention

Beyond the fact that independent invention is no defense to patent
infringement, patents may become even more attractive because an independent inventor may patent another’s trade secret as long as the inventor has
125 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 64, at 835 (“Patents last for twenty years from the
date of filing; secrets (including trade secrets) last as long as sufficient secrecy is
maintained.”).
126 Id.
127 See González-Álvarez & Nieto-Antolı́n, supra note 43, at 291 (“[C]ompanies that use
complex knowledge tend to choose cost and time imitation as protection mechanism since
the knowledge complexity will increase the time and resources needed to imitate that
knowledge.”).
128 See Mann, supra note 70, at 1020 (“[I]t is easy for competitors who observe a new
product to design and deploy products that include the functionality of that new product.”); Risch, supra note 6, at 1648 (“[S]oftware might be reverse engineered, which is an
acceptable way to discover a trade secret.”).
129 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 31, at 338–39 (classifying “software source code” as a
type of invention “that can be discerned by evaluating the product, but only with difficulty”); Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse Engineering, 111 YALE L.J. 1575, 1580 (2002) (“When computer programs are distributed in object
code form, a difficult analytical process is required to ascertain information embedded in
the program, but it is there for the taking if a reverse engineer is willing to spend the time
to study it.”).
130 See Mann, supra note 70, at 1020 n.297 (“A firm will be more seriously harmed if it
loses codified technology than if it loses technology that it has not yet developed into a
specific implementation.”). On the other hand, pharmaceuticals are easy to reverse engineer, so modeling points to patenting, supported by empirical evidence. See Zaby, supra
note 35, at 160 (“In an industry sector with a high propensity to patent, such as
Pharmaceuticals, the easiness of reverse engineering is rather high . . . .”).
131 See Levine, supra note 44, at 174 (“Additionally, the existence of the right to a perennial secret might make sense in the commercial context where the owner of the secret
runs the risk of it being reverse-engineered or independently discovered.”).
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developed the same invention by legitimate means.132 The fact that a third
party may not only escape trade secret infringement via the shield of independent invention, but also acquire a sword to accuse others of patent
infringement—perhaps even the original trade secret holder—may often tip
the balance in favor of patent protection.133
For instance, Professor Ronald Mann postulates that software startups
have no “foothold” protection in trade secrecy given the possibility of independent discovery or invention and subsequent patenting.134 Similarly,
there is evidence that pharmaceutical and biotech companies decide to patent processes—which otherwise could be maintained as trade secrets—
because “if they do not patent the process, they risk that another firm will
patent it, and block them from further developing and using it.”135 On this
view, patents are used not because they are necessarily a superior form of IP
protection, but simply because there is “no choice but to patent.”136 In this
regard, more competition naturally means more risk of being patented out
of existence.137 Thus, despite the high costs to patenting, the risk of complete or even partial loss may be a powerful incentive to patent.138 This is
arguably especially the case when a company can withhold some sensitive
information about an invention, yet still disclose enough to obtain a
patent.139
132 See Patents or Trade Secrets?, supra note 6 (“A trade secret may be patented by someone else who developed the relevant information by legitimate means.”).
133 See Helmers & Rogers, supra note 42, at 1018 (“Firms may decide to patent even
despite secrecy being more effective in protecting an innovation if there is the possibility
that a competitor patents a similar innovation first.”).
134 See Mann, supra note 70, at 1020 (“[T]rade secrecy does nothing to provide the
‘foothold’ protection that is useful to smaller firms trying to fend off large firm efforts to
market competing products. . . . Although patents arguably give small firms some shelter in
those contests, trade secret law does not offer the same protection.”).
135 Lee Davis, Intellectual Property Rights, Strategy and Policy, 13 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW
TECH. 399, 408 (2004).
136 Id. (“Today firms typically apply for patents [on the product and process]. . . . This
does not mean that they consider patents as enhancing their incentives to create new
processes, or even a better means of protection (in fact, patents carry the disadvantage that
the information must be published in the patent document), but that they feel they have
no choice but to patent.”).
137 See Bronwyn H. Hall & Vania Sena, Innovation, IP Choice, and Productivity: Evidence from UK Firms 7 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://
www.bancaditalia.it/pubblicazioni/altri-atti-seminari/2012/Hall.pdf (“[F]irms in more
competitive sectors . . . tend to use more legal IP methods (i.e. patents and trade marks).”).
138 See W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Secrecy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1769, 1782 (2016)
(noting that if a firm wants to keep their innovation a secret, patenting their product is not
the way to go because there will be some amount of disclosure involved).
139 See James J. Anton et al., Policy Implications of Weak Patent Rights, in 6 NAT’L BUREAU
OF ECON. RESEARCH, INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY 1, 6–7 (Adam B. Jaffe et al. eds.,
2006) (noting three types of secrecy effectiveness in patents one of which is the naked idea
invention where some element of private information exists).
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Inability to Market or Even Explain to Investors

A major challenge with utilizing trade secrecy (in the legal sense) is having to utilize secrecy (in the general sense).140 Trade secrecy typically does
not attract venture capitalists and other investors who may refuse to sign confidentiality agreements.141 Patents, on the other hand, are typically more
well-defined sets of rights that can provide something “tangible” for startups
to sell to potential investors.142
Patents may allow for better signaling to investors, and thus may be more
valuable to inexperienced innovators.143 Or it may simply be the case that a
company is willing to disclose otherwise secret information to raise investment dollars regardless of whether it can patent or gain other IP protection.144 In contrast, beyond startup financing, trade secrecy may make it
more difficult for analysts and institutional investors to follow companies that
140 See, e.g., Bambauer, supra note 64, at 840–41, 844–45 (noting the difficulty in keeping trade secrets a secret and the various ways trade secrets can be revealed).
141 See Png, supra note 13, at 27 (“[T]rade secrets might not help to attract venture
capitalists.”). Startups need patents to market. See Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1288
(“[A] partial explanation for the widespread use of patents by technology entrepreneurs[ ]
concerns the function that patents serve in helping the startup compete in the marketplace with its innovative technology.”); Andrew A. Schwartz, The Corporate Preference for
Trade Secret, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 623, 667 (2013) (drawing on empirical research to argue that
startups should use patents because of venture capital needs). To that end, interest in
international markets makes patents more useful than informal methods if looking to
international markets. See Peter Neuhäusler, The Use of Patents and Informal Appropriation
Mechanisms—Differences Between Sectors and Among Companies, 32 TECHNOVATION 681, 684
(2012) (“[P]atents especially play an important role in the ability of firms to enter foreign
markets. Besides market entry, formal instruments, e.g. patents, could provide firms an
edge on international markets.”). But see Lippoldt & Schultz, supra note 38, at 9 (“The
availability of trade secrets protection may also play a role in international diffusion of
technologies and other information via foreign direct investment (FDI) or trade.”).
142 See Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 831 (1987) (“Patents may be much
more important for a start-up company because they provide something tangible to sell if
the firm tries to sell out later.”).
143 See Annamaria Conti et al., Patents As Signals for Startup Financing 4, 14 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19191, 2013) (“[P]atents [act] as a signal of technology quality to investors . . . .” “[T]he founders of a startup strategically use patents to
convey information about the value of their inventions, given that external investors judge
the quality of these inventions based on the patents they observe.”); David H. Hsu & Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Patents as Quality Signals for Entrepreneurial Ventures 12 (2007)
(unpublished draft) (“Early stages of funding are characterized by greater technical and
demand uncertainty in product development. In such settings, start-up quality signals such
as patents are particularly important . . . .”).
144 See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade
Secret Protection: A Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 402
(2002) (“[L]oss of a trade secret may not financially devastate some enterprises. For some
products, being first in the marketplace provides a significant economic advantage over
competitors.”).
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are publicly traded.145 To the extent that a startup’s strategy is to do an
initial public offering (IPO), a business strategy centered around trade
secrecy may not be the most sensible.146
4.

Tension with Open Source, Open Innovation, and Other “Sharing”
Models

The growth of open innovation, open source, and other business models
that require significant sharing of information between companies and individuals could deter use of trade secrecy and other intellectual property doctrines.147 Specifically, close cooperative relationships and joint projects often
render it difficult to maintain trade secrets, so first-mover advantage or patents may become the best appropriation option.148
For example, computer chip designer Open-Silicon claims to successfully use an open business model “that enables the company to uniquely
choose best-in-industry [Internet Protocol], design methodologies, tools,
software, packaging, manufacturing and test capabilities,” resulting in part145 See Nishant Dass et al., Intellectual Property Protection and Financial Markets: Patenting vs. Secrecy 3 (July 25, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2517838 (“The opacity that results from a greater reliance on
secrecy could reduce the extent to which the firm is followed by analysts and held by institutional investors.”).
146 See id. at 4 (“[S]tronger trade secret protection lowers analyst forecast quality in
terms of dispersion and accuracy.”).
147 See HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN BUSINESS MODELS: HOW TO THRIVE IN THE NEW INNOVATION LANDSCAPE 2 (2006) (describing how the growing division of innovation labor
opens up a company’s business model and allows them to acquire more ideas); HENRY W.
CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING AND PROFITING FROM
TECHNOLOGY 43 (2003) (“Open Innovation means that valuable ideas can come from
inside or outside the company and can go to market from inside or outside the company as
well.”); Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation
Toward Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 577 (2000) (“A robust
public domain in existing information” “requires self-conscious policy choices to support
the development of free software and open source strategies for software development.”);
Megan Ristau Baca, Book Note, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 271, 277 (2006) (“Benkler hails the success of
free software as critical to the recognition of the peer production model as a viable alternative to industrial production.”); Heather R. Pruger & Adam S. Zarren, Open Source Software:
Buyer Beware of Custom Development and M&A Transaction Risks, MD. B.J., Nov. 2014, at 22, 24
(“Open source software can be easier to manage than proprietary third-party software, as
open source products do not require location- or machine-specific counting, tracking, or
monitoring, whereas proprietary third-party software products are often licensed on a perinstance basis and require close monitoring.”).
148 See Leiponen & Byma, supra note 59, at 1486 (“[I]nnovative small firms that have
close cooperative arrangements may be at a disadvantage in protecting their innovation
returns.” “Secrecy is difficult to maintain in joint projects . . . . Thus, the only recourse is to
appropriate returns to innovation by quick market launch.”).
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nerships with “over 150 companies.”149 Similarly, “Free and Open Source
hardware,” also known as “Libre Hardware,” “is gaining significant traction in
the scientific hardware community, where there is evidence that open development creates both technically superior and far less expensive scientific
equipment than proprietary models.”150 Thus, trade secrets may stand in the
way of a startup’s newer business model or strategy, as well as the benefits of
information diffusion to consumers, industry, and society as a whole.151
5.

Reliance on Contracts Like Covenants Not to Compete and
Nondisclosure Agreements

Some scholars have argued that contracts can, or least should, do all that
trade secrecy can do.152 Although this view is debatable, often noncompete
and nondisclosure agreements can effectively substitute for trade secrecy protection, at least for those bound by these agreements.153 Technically, contracting with employees does not preclude use of trade secrets as a
complementary form of protection.154 In this sense, contract and trade
149 Marketwired, Open-Silicon Unveils Industry’s Highest Performance Interlaken Chip-to-Chip
Interface IP, YAHOO! FIN. (Apr. 4, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/open-siliconunveils-industrys-highest-120000246.html.
150 Joshua M. Pearce, Emerging Business Models for Open Source Hardware, 1 J. OPEN HARDWARE 1, 1 (2017) (comparing such models to “[c]onventional business models” that
achieve monopoly “by either protecting the . . . related to the product as a trade secret or
with a patent”).
151 See, e.g., Levine, supra note 44, at 165 (“The vastly divergent roles and responsibilities of government, like transparency and accountability, versus industry’s premium on
secrecy, profit-making, and competition, make the application of trade secrecy to public
institutions—or private entities operating in the public sphere—troubling.”).
152 See Bone, supra note 23, at 297 (“[W]ith perhaps a few limited exceptions, trade
secrets should be protected only on contract principles.”); James W. Hill, Trade Secrets,
Unjust Enrichment, and the Classification of Obligations, 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶ 44 (1999)
(“Professor Bone believes that ‘trade secret law is not essential to the protection of intellectual property; in fact, most of its benefits are better achieved through contract . . . .’”
(quoting Bone, supra note 23, at 246–47)); Alan J. Tracey, The Contract in the Trade Secret
Ballroom—A Forgotten Dance Partner?, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 47, 66 (2007) (“In some
cases, the contract is thought to serve the dual function of satisfying trade secret
requirements . . . .”).
153 See Sampsa Samila & Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants: Incentives to Innovate or
Impediments to Growth, 57 MGMT. SCI. 425, 427 (2011) (“Even when companies have alternative mechanisms for protecting their intellectual property, the enforcement of noncompete covenants might still strengthen these protections.”); id. at 432 (“But patenting might
also increase even in the absence of greater innovation if firms attempt to substitute patents for the intellectual property protection offered by noncompete covenants. . . .
[F]irms, on average, invest less in R&D under regimes of strong noncompete enforcement;
thus one would expect them to produce fewer innovations.”).
154 See Trade Secret Litigation and Confidentiality Agreements, HINCH NEWMAN LLP, http://
www.hinchnewman.com/practice-areas/internet-law/trade-secret-agreements-confidentiality-non-compete-social-media-policies/ (last visited Sept. 18, 2018) (“Confidentiality agreements serve to protect company trade secrets, intellectual property, and other proprietary
information.”).
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secrecy are not always substitutes.155 Indeed, noncompete agreements can
bolster baseline trade secret protection, making it even more difficult for an
employee to depart for a competitor.156 On the other hand, the fear of an
employee running off with the startup’s crown jewels may easily lead the firm
to patent, which may preclude at least some trade secret protection.157
II. THE PAUCITY

OF

EMPIRICAL STUDIES

ON

TRADE SECRECY

Although trade secret theory is certainly far from a finished product,
empirical studies of trade secrets are still in their infancy, and other than the
few articles reporting on the Berkeley Patent Survey, there are no reported
studies focusing on the use of trade secrets by startups.158 This “gap in the
[empirical] literature” on “alternatives to the patent system for appropriating
innovative results” like “industrial secret[s]”159 clearly supports the need for
more empirical work. Indeed, in perhaps the most comprehensive survey of
empirical studies on trade secrecy to date, Professor Michael Risch opines
155 See Hill, supra note 152, ¶ 96 (arguing that the rationales and values inherent in
trade secret law cannot be protected through contract law alone); Lemley, supra note 31, at
331–32 (“Trade secret law also reaches where contract alone cannot. . . . [I]t extends the
reach of the law beyond privity of contract to anyone who comes into contact with a secret
knowing that they have acquired it by accident, mistake, or by another’s malfeasance.”).
156 See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1272 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming an
injunction barring an employee from taking on a position at a competitor company
because his reliance on PepsiCo’s information was inevitable); Carey DeWitt, Trade Secret
Law for the Employment Lawyer: Handling a Misappropriation Case, MICH. B.J., Jan. 2005, at 20,
22–23 (explaining that “trade secret law is often connected with enforcement of non-compete [agreements]” and “[s]uch agreements are legitimately designed to prevent postemployment unfair competition by the departing employee”); see also WAJSMAN & GARCÍAVALERO, supra note 31, at 15 (noting that explicit nondisclosure and noncompete clauses
in employee contracts may inhibit employee mobility). The controversial “inevitable disclosure doctrine” could also serve the same purpose, as it allows employers to control former employee behavior without proving actual damage. Shannon Aaron, Note, Using the
History of Noncompetition Agreements to Guide the Future of the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine, 17
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1191, 1191 (2013) (“Some states have expressly rejected the doctrine while other states have openly accepted it.”).
157 See Gallié & Legros, supra note 107, at 782–83 (“Analysing the link between human
resources practices and the choice between patenting and trade secrecy . . . the introduction of strategies to secure employee loyalty (in other words, to reduce job mobility) leads
to greater use of trade secrets than patents. Firms with a high turnover of engineers prefer
the patenting strategy to limit the risks of information being disseminated.”).
158 See supra Introduction.
159 Jesús Galende, The Appropriation of the Results of Innovative Activity, 35 INT’L J. TECH.
MGMT. 107, 108, 111 fig.1 (2006); see also Stuart J.H. Graham, Hiding in the Patent’s Shadow:
Firms’ Uses of Secrecy to Capture Value from New Discoveries 30 (GaTech TI:GER Working Paper
Series, 2004), https://smartech.gatech.edu/bitstream/handle/1853/10725/gt_tiger_hiding.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=Y (“Secrecy, long known to be the most effective method
of capturing value from discoveries, has heretofore been hidden from us.”).
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that “the reality is that we know very little about trade secrets, despite the best
efforts of a handful of scholars conducting research in this area.”160
Of course, there is a good reason for the dearth of literature:
“[C]ompanies’ use of [trade] secrecy” is “unobserv[able].”161 Nonetheless,
there have been a few broad empirical studies, though many of the leading
studies in the field are dated.162 For instance, Professor Bronwyn Hall
recently reviewed the existing trade secret empirical literature and noted that
the “seminal studies”163 in the field remain the Levin et al. study from
1987164 and the Cohen et al. study from 2000.165
While the major studies in the field may be dated, the trend is toward
more scholarly focus on trade secrecy, particularly with the adoption of the
European Union (EU) Trade Secret Directive166 and the Defend Trade
160

Michael Risch, Empirical Methods in Trade Secret Research, in 2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 1 (Peter S. Menell & David L. Schwartz
eds., forthcoming 2019). The EC’s comprehensive 2013 survey of existing trade secret
literature noted the almost complete absence of nonmanufacturing entities in existing
datasets, a significant weakness. See EUR. COMM’N, Study on Trade Secrets, supra note 41, at
97. Png explained in 2011 that “[d]espite the practical importance of trade secrecy to
innovation, there has been little empirical research into the [economic] impact of trade
secrets . . . .” Png, supra note 13, at 2.
161 Hall et al., The Choice Between, supra note 8, at 410 (noting the “empirical difficulty of
observing the use of [trade] secrecy as an appropriation mechanism”); see also David S.
Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L.
REV. 291, 292 (2009); Lippoldt & Schultz, supra note 38, at 10.
162 See Petra Moser, Innovation Without Patents: Evidence from World’s Fairs, 55 J.L. &
ECON. 43, 44 (2012) (“A lack of systematic economywide data, however, has made it impossible to measure the share of innovations that occur outside the patent system.”). Despite
the reality of limited empirical data, there is also limited historical analysis of trade secret
use. See Risch, supra note 31, at 5 (noting that because trade secrets are so different from
patents and copyrights, trade secret history does not provide a normative basis for the law).
163 Hall & Sena, supra note 137, at 5 (“The seminal studies in [intellectual property
empirical literature] are those by Levin et al. (1987)—so called Yale I survey—and Cohen
et al. (2000)—the Carnegie Mellon survey.”).
164 See Levin et al., supra note 142, at 785, 787 (examining “appropriability conditions
in more than one hundred manufacturing industries” and finding that “more
appropriability is better, that better protection necessarily leads to more innovation, which
yields better economic performance”).
165 See Wesley M. Cohen et al., Protecting Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions
and Why U.S. Manufacturing Firms Patent (or Not) 1 (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 7552, 2000) ( “[F]irms typically protect the profits due to invention with a range
of mechanisms . . . . [P]atents tend to be the least emphasized [mechanism] by firms in the
majority of manufacturing industries, and secrecy and lead time tend to be emphasized
most heavily.”). Almeling has conducted recent empirical studies of trade secret litigation
at the state and federal levels, but these do not focus on trade secrecy at the firm level. See
David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46
GONZ. L. REV. 57, 69 (2010) (noting that 93% of trade secret state cases involved an
employee or a business partner); Almeling et al., supra note 161, at 294 (noting that 85%
of trade secret federal cases involved an employee or a business partner).
166 See Trade Secrets, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/intellectualproperty/trade-secrets/index_en.htm (last updated Aug. 11, 2018) [hereinafter EUR.
ON THE
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Secrets Act (DTSA) in the United States.167 Specifically, the EU Trade Secret
Directive, adopted on June 8, 2016,168 “aims to standardise the national laws
in EU countries against the unlawful acquisition, disclosure and use of trade
secrets.”169 The DTSA, which became law in May 2016 and represents the
biggest development in U.S. intellectual property law in years, provides a
broad federal private cause of action for trade secret misappropriation.170
Here, we focus on the trade secret empirical literature as it applies to
startups. As an initial matter, it is important to note that startups are often
conflated with small businesses (in Europe, often termed “small and
medium-sized entities” (SMEs)).171 While it is generally true that startups
tend to be SMEs, it is not the case that SMEs must be startups. As one commentator noted, “not all SMEs are equal. . . . [S]tart-ups tend to be a group of
their own and not surprisingly may have appropriability strategies that are
different from established small firms.”172
Although there have been a number of studies on SMEs, other than the
limited data released to date from the Berkeley Patent Survey, there is nothing in the trade secrecy empirical literature focusing on startups as a separate
category.173 The result is that most views of how startups use trade secrecy
are based on anecdote and speculation. For example, the seminal Levin et
al. study notes that “start-up ventures” were “completely excluded” from the
study, but Levin speculates that patents—implicitly, in contrast to trade
COMM’N, Trade Secrets] (stating that the Trade Secret Directive “aims to standardise the
national laws in EU countries against the unlawful acquisition, disclosure and use of trade
secrets”).
167 See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 5, 130 Stat. 376, 384
(noting that the Act “applies broadly to protect trade secrets from theft”).
168 See Directive 2016/943, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June
2016 on the Protection of Undisclosed Know-How and Business Information (Trade
Secrets) Against Their Unlawful Acquisition, Use and Disclosure, 2016 O.J. (L 157). The
Directive requires EU countries to bring into force the laws and administrative provisions
necessary to comply with the Directive by June 9, 2018. See id. at art. 19, para. 1 (“Member
States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and administrative provisions necessary to
comply with this Directive by 9 June 2018.”).
169 EUR. COMM’N, Trade Secrets, supra note 166.
170 See Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of
Trade Secret Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 833 (2017) (“The May 11, 2016 enactment of
the DTSA created a federal civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation for the
first time.”); see also Levine & Seaman, supra note 3, at 108 (noting the increasing profile of
trade secret litigation, and that nearly 500 federal cases were filed under the DTSA in its
first year).
171 See Hall et al., unpublished draft, supra note 8, at 405 (indicating that small and
medium-sized enterprises are also called SMEs and associating startups with SMEs).
172 Id. at 405–06 (noting that startups, which are known as being an SME, have a different strategy than many other SMEs.) For example, like large companies, patents can be
important to startups while detrimental to other SMEs. Id.
173 As noted earlier, the few articles from the Berkeley Patent Survey reporting on trade
secrecy were quite limited, describing only general results related to the relative importance of patenting and trade secrecy as well as to the reasons not to patent. See Graham et
al., supra note 7, at 1290–93, 1295–96; Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 173.
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secrets—may be more important for a startup than for more established companies because “they provide something tangible to sell if the firm tries to sell
out later.”174
In the following discussion of existing studies, we follow a similar “speculative” strategy. First, although SMEs are not synonymous with startups, they
often overlap, so we begin by reporting on SME-focused studies.175 Next, we
broaden our discussion to more general studies, speculating on how those
findings relate to startups.176
A.

Previous Empirical Studies of SMEs and Trade Secrecy

In these studies, SMEs tend to favor trade secrecy over patents.177 The
most common reason SMEs prefer trade secrecy is the cost of obtaining and
enforcing patents.178 For example, a survey of 2849 R&D performing firms
174 Levin et al., supra note 142, at 831. Theoretical papers discuss startups a bit more
frequently. See, e.g., Andreas Panagopoulos & In-Uck Park, Patenting vs. Secrecy for Startups
and the Trade of Patents as Negotiating Assets 13 (Univ. of Crete, Dep’t of Econ., Working
Paper No. 1610, 2015), http://economics.soc.uoc.gr/wpa/docs/1610.pdf (concluding
that patents are better than trade secrets for incentivizing startups); Ivan Png, Trade
Secrets, Non-Competes, and Inventor Mobility: Empirical Evidence, 14–15 (June 2012)
(unpublished manuscript), https://conference.druid.dk/acc_papers/dthe9spk32t5q331
rl0hck9duor6.pdf (constraints on using knowledge because of trade secrets and CNCs
leads to fewer spin-outs and startups, based on a study of employed investors with utility
patents from the U.S. Patent Inventor Database).
175 See infra Section II.A.
176 See infra Section II.B.
177 See EUR. COMM’N, Study on Trade Secrets, supra note 41, at 2 (“The higher perceived
cost of patent ownership and the material impact that disclosure may have on SME firm
value and performance encourage use of secrecy as a protection mechanism.”); Arundel,
supra note 32, at 614 (“The results show that firms of all sizes find secrecy to be relatively
more important than patents, but small firms find secrecy to be of greater importance than
larger firms.”); Gallié & Legros, supra note 107, at 782 (noting that small and mediumsized firms prefer secrecy and that patent propensity rates tend to increase with firm size);
Leiponen & Byma, supra note 59, at 1479 (conducting a literature review and concluding
that patents are less “efficient”). But cf. Mann, supra note 70, at 966, 1021 (conducting a
survey of sixty people knowledgeable about SME software companies and finding trade
secrets were not particularly helpful).
178 See EUR. COMM’N, Study on Trade Secrets, supra note 41, at 103–04 (“Based on a survey
among 198 small US firms operating in high technology sectors” “two main reasons why
small, high-technology firms may choose secrecy over patents are the costs involved in
enforcing patent rights and the requirement to disclose the innovation as part of the patent application.”); id. at 108 (“Concerns over patent enforcement costs and disclosure
requirements are important reasons why SMEs prefer trade secret compared to patent protection.”). Kitching’s study of 400 British SMEs indicated that the cost of maintaining patents was “prohibitively high,” so those entities would rather allocate limited resources to
“new product and process innovations.” See John Kitching & Robert Blackburn, Intellectual
Property Management in the Small and Medium Enterprise (SME), 5 J. SMALL BUS. & ENTERPRISE
DEV. 327, 331, 333 (1998) (“The money costs of filing, maintaining and defending a patent
are often perceived by business owners as prohibitively high.” “Instead of acquiring and
enforcing formal intellectual property rights to protect existing products, SME owners pre-
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found that secrecy is more important than patents, and small firms find
secrecy more important than large firms.179 Surveys of eight Finnish SMEs,
including IT firms, found that secrecy was the most popular appropriation
method, ahead of IP and contracts.180 Another survey of small Finnish firms
found 62% using secrecy (the third highest total in the survey; speed to market was slightly higher) versus 16% using patents (lowest of all surveyed
options).181 Naturally, these surveys also confirm the corollary that large
firms benefit more from patents.182 There is also little reported variance
between process- and product-focused firms.183
It is notable that, in at least one study, the risk of departing employees
misappropriating trade secrets did not appear to justify using patents instead
of trade secrecy and other mechanisms. Specifically, a study of 400 SME
owner-managers in British computer software, design, electronics, and
mechanical engineering firms found that 71% of their “products, services or
methods of working were dependent [ ]on specialist or confidential knowledge,” and the biggest threat of loss was departing employees.184 The most
common response (79%) was not to resort to patents as a means of protecting against leakage,185 but rather to build “[t]rust relationships that ensure
specialist knowledge is not stolen,”186 which is at the heart of “reasonable
efforts” in trade secrecy.187 Even though patents are generally viewed as a
more powerful right than trade secret protection, this result suggests that the
ferred to allocate resources to the development of new product and process innovations.”).
Olander notes the SME’s challenge of simultaneously having to share knowledge with partners but lacking resources to use “expensive and complex protection mechanisms.”
Olander et al., supra note 82, at 364 (“The limited resources of SMEs simultaneously create
(1) the need to disclose their knowledge to varying partners, and (2) impediments to using
expensive and complex protection mechanisms.”).
179 See Arundel, supra note 32, at 614 (“Several additional factors, such as the types of
information sources used by the firm, also influence the relative importance of secrecy vs.
patents.”).
180 See Olander et al., supra note 82, at 361–62 (“[O]btaining IPRs, with the exception
of copyright, is often difficult, whereas informal protection mechanisms (e.g. secrecy) are
more readily at the SMEs’ disposal.”)
181 See Leiponen & Byma, supra note 59, at 1482 (“Complementary products are the
most commonly used strategy for innovating firms . . . followed by speed to market . . . and
secrecy . . . .”).
182 See Gallié & Legros, supra note 107, at 787; Helmers & Rogers, supra note 42, at
1018; id. at 1479 (reviewing literature); see also Dass et al., supra note 145, at 4 (noting
SMEs, based on total assets or market share, reduce patents after enactment of trade secret
statutes, and stock liquidity diminishes).
183 EUR. COMM’N, Study on Trade Secrets, supra note 41, at 103 tbl.3.
184 See, e.g., Kitching & Blackburn, supra note 178, at 329.
185 Id. at 332. This question was not asked in this context, but 23.6% of entities overall
indicated that they utilized patents. See id. at 330.
186 Id. at 332 tbl.3.
187 See Dass et al., supra note 145, at 9–10 (noting that one of the six items that characterize the three aspects of trade secrets is whether the owner must take reasonable efforts
to protect the secret); see also STEWART S. MANELA ET AL., EMPLOYEE DUTY OF LOYALTY: A
STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY 1 (1995) (stating that “[t]he employment relationship is one of
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costs of patenting are often greater than the risk of departing employees,
particularly when that risk can be mitigated through firm culture and personal relationships.188 Of course, in many situations, specialized and confidential knowledge may be protectable as a trade secret but may not be
inventive enough—or may be of such a nature—as not to be patentable.189
Thus, even for firms that can afford patent protection, trade secrecy—with its
more expansive set of protectable subject matter—may be the only option
available.190
B.

Speculating on the Results of More General Studies

In view of the limited empirical research even indirectly addressing startups and trade secrecy, there are some broad themes that emerge from the
more general trade secret empirical research that may help discern how and
why startups use trade secrets (or not). Here, we analyze those studies to
form hypotheses regarding startups that we then test via our study.
1.

The Benefits of “Informal” vs. “Formal” IP

Trade secrecy is usually categorized as an “informal” method of appropriation. For example, it is common to define “formal” IP as including patents, trademarks, copyright, and registered designs, and “informal” IP as
including “secrecy, confidentiality agreements, lead time, or complexity.”191
The meaning of this distinction is not entirely clear, especially as trade
secrecy has similar attributes to formal IP in that it is statutorily-based and
operates as an “ex ante incentive[ ] to innovate.”192 Moreover, “unregistered
trust, confidence and loyalty” that obligates employees to use and to refrain from using
trade secrets in certain ways).
188 Gallié & Legros, supra note 107, at 782–83 (“Analysing the link between human
resource practices and the choice between patenting and secrecy . . . the introduction of
strategies to secure employee loyalty (in other words, to reduce job mobility) leads to
greater use of trade secrets than patents.”); Patents or Trade Secrets?, supra note 6 (“A trade
secret is more difficult to enforce than a patent. The level of protection granted to trade
secrets . . . is generally considered weak, particularly when compared with the protection
granted by a patent.”).
189 See Nisvan Erkal, On the Interaction Between Patent and Trade Secret Policy 1, 10 (Oct.
2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.nisvanerkal.net/patent-trade-secrecyfinal.pdf (noting that there are innovations that are entitled to trade secret protection but
they are not developed enough to qualify for patent protection).
190 See JENNIFER BRANT & SEBASTIAN LOHSE, INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, TRADE
SECRETS: TOOLS FOR INNOVATION AND COLLABORATION 10 (2014) (noting that it would be
advantageous for enterprises to rely on trade secrets over patents); see also Levine, supra
note 44, at 150, 154 (noting that almost any valuable information can be held as a trade
secret).
191 Hall et al., The Choice Between, supra note 8, at 376.
192 Id. (“[Trade secrets] provid[e] a reward system that makes it easier for innovators to
make ex post profits if their innovation is successful by allowing them to exclude imitators
for a finite period.”). Although the origins of trade secrecy lie in the common law, at least
in the United States, most of trade secret law is now based in statute, such as the Uniform
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formal IP” and informal IP share the problem that they are “by construction,
largely unobservable or only partially observable to third parties, which creates a formidable challenge for empirical work.”193
It is conceivable that “secrecy,” as a general business practice, could be
construed as informal IP whereas the use of “trade secrecy,” as a legal doctrine, would be viewed as formal.194 Whatever the proper characterization of
trade secret rights, it is worth noting that several existing studies show that
informal IP is often a stronger or more preferred appropriation method than
formal IP, particularly with regard to patents, and remains on the rise generally (even past the seminal Cohen study).195 Although these studies find that
small firms often prefer informal IP, given startups’ reliance on patents for
financing, it is less clear whether the ease and low costs of trade secrets necessarily trump the use of patents in the startup setting.196
2.

Products vs. Processes

The literature also draws a meaningful distinction between innovative
processes and innovative products.197 Generally, studies have shown that
secrecy and lead-time are more important means than patents when protecting process innovations against duplication and competition.198 Processes
are usually harder to detect, and therefore are more apt for trade secret protection; conversely, it can often be difficult to use trade secrecy to shield a
Trade Secrets Act, Defend Trade Secrets Act, and the Economic Espionage Act. See id. at
377 (“[I]n most common law countries, including the United Kingdom and the United
States, trade secret law forms part of the common law . . . .”); Economic Espionage Act of
1996, 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2012); Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, 130
Stat. 376 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1985).
193 Hall et al., The Choice Between, supra note 8, at 378.
194 Perhaps related to that point, the authors in Hall et al, The Choice Between, supra note
8, note that the “‘informal’ label does not imply the absence of legal contracts and obligations.” Id. at 378 n.9.
195 See Cohen et al., supra note 165, at 10 (“Secrecy is now clearly the most effective
mechanism[ ] in [the] aggregate . . . .”); Hall et al., The Choice Between, supra note 8, at 378
(“The evidence available from various firm-level surveys . . . suggests that on average, firms
rely more on informal than formal IP to protect their inventions, and that most firms use
no IP protection at all.”); Leiponen & Byma, supra note 59, at 1478 (“Most of the small
firms examined here find informal means of protection, such as speed to market or
secrecy, more important than patenting.”).
196 See supra Section I.A (discussing how startups and small firms may be subjected to
high costs in the process of obtaining a patent; however, trade secrets are not granted the
exclusive rights that patents are).
197 See, e.g., Hall et al., The Choice Between, supra note 8, at 405 (noting that “[p]roduct
innovations are more likely to represent patentable subject matter” meaning that there is
less uncertainty and that “[p]atents on process innovations may also reveal more information than patents on products”).
198 See id. at 380 (“On average, patents are not the most important mechanism of IP
appropriation, while secrecy and lead time are . . . .”).
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product that can be easily accessed and examined.199 In this regard, the
European Commission’s survey of existing trade secret empirical studies concluded that process innovations are widely protected by trade secrecy.200
Thus, one would expect to find that startups value trade secrecy more for
processes than products.
3.

Lead-Time and First-Mover Advantage

Maintaining lead time (also known as “first mover advantage”) is often
cited as a primary reason to use trade secrecy.201 Indeed, the common “lead
time injunction” is designed to bar “use of a trade secret for a limited period
of time adequate to prevent the defendant from gaining a competitive advantage through use of the stolen trade secret.”202 For example, in a study of
8000 British and American innovations at world fairs between 1851 and 1915,
secrecy was “often used as a complement to other mechanisms such as lead
time (being the first to introduce a new product to the market) and the provision of unique complementary assets.”203 Another study found that “both
patents and [trade secrets] can be strategically used to create market lead
times.”204 Similarly, a study of “small and innovative Finnish manufacturing
and service firms” found that “speed to market” was slightly more preferred
than secrecy and much more preferred than patents.205 In this regard, studies—such as the European Commission’s (EC)—find that the most important reason to use trade secrecy is not wanting to disclose information, which
presumably results in losing lead-time advantage.206
199 See Arundel, supra note 32, at 613 (“The survey results for process innovations can
be explained by the ability of firms to keep process innovations hidden from their competitors for long periods of time.”); Cohen et al., supra note 165, at 10; Hall et al., The Choice
Between, supra note 8, at 380 (reviewing literature); Katrin Hussinger, Is Silence Golden? Patents Versus Secrecy at the Firm Level, 15 ECON. INNOVATION & NEW TECH. 735, 751 (2006)
(noting that firms likely use trade secrecy for process innovations, “which is not captured
by sales figures with new products”).
200 See EUR. COMM’N, Study on Trade Secrets, supra note 41, at 97–100.
201 See Arundel, supra note 32, at 615 fig.1 (surveying 2849 R&D performing firms and
finding that lead-time is far more important than secrecy and patents); Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Puumalainen, supra note 33, at 106 (finding a positive relationship between seeking short-term value and the use of lead-time and noting that IPR, which was defined as
separate from “secrecy,” was not “used for this purpose”). This result, assuming the accuracy of the dichotomy, might make sense for startups as well, given lead-time’s overlap with
trade secrecy. Indeed, Graham suggests that lead-time efforts will limit use of secrecy. See
Graham, supra note 159, at 10.
202 Patrick Keating, “Lead Time” Injunctions, PATRICK KEATING (Oct. 24, 2015), http://
pkeating.com/?p=393.
203 Moser, supra note 162, at 46 n.5.
204 Holgersson, supra note 88, at 25.
205 Leiponen & Byma, supra note 59, at 1478, 1486.
206 See, e.g., EUR. COMM’N, Study on Trade Secrets, supra note 41, at 124 (“The most
important reason why businesses rely on [trade secrets] rather than on other IPRs concerns the need to not disclose information . . . .”).
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The implications from these results for startups, however, are not
entirely clear. Although trade secrecy can be used to achieve lead-time
advantages, there are other means—such as continuous advancements over
competitors—that may be equally effective.207 Indeed, several studies have
shown that less important innovations skew toward patenting, while more
important innovations skew toward trade secrecy, all other factors being
equal.208
4.

Industry Analysis: Software and Biotechnology

A number of studies have made major efforts to analyze trade secrecy in
the context of specific industries. However, in its review of existing empirical
studies, the EC study noted an important limitation: with one exception, “[a]
drawback of these studies . . . is that they focus exclusively on manufacturing
industries and do not evaluate empirically the importance of trade secrets in
a non-manufacturing setting.”209
The two leading studies, Levin et al. and Cohen et al., generally found
that a range of industries prefer trade secrecy, whether for products or
processes.210 To the extent that there are any consistent findings, the chemical industry tends to value trade secrecy more than others.211 On the other
end, industries that produce innovations that can be easily copied or duplicated naturally tend to find trade secrecy less desirable.212
A study of French firms found that “technology-push” industries—
namely, those where the technology itself (rather than market preferences
207 See, e.g., González-Álvarez & Nieto-Antolı́n, supra note 43, at 288–89 (in a study of
258 Spanish manufacturing companies, “[c]ontinuous innovation that enables companies
to keep their competitors behind is the mechanism most commonly used,” ahead of trade
secrets and patents).
208 See Gallié & Legros, supra note 107, at 786; Helmers & Rogers, supra note 42, at
1018; Pajak, supra note 42, at 10.
209 EUR. COMM’N, Study on Trade Secrets, supra note 41, at 97.
210 See id. at 97–100 (referencing Cohen’s study of 1478 manufacturing R&D labs,
which found trade secrets generally very important).
211 Sector analysis shows chemical industry and a few others consistently preferring
trade secrets. See Pajak, supra note 42, at 10 (noting that in the chemical industry, secrecy
is more commonly used than patents); see also Cohen et. al., supra note 165, at 33 tbl.2
(secrecy used most by textile, paper, chemicals, rubber, plastics, drugs, and metal); Leiponen & Byma, supra note 59, at 1483 tbl.4; Moser, supra note 162, at 58, 64, 65 tbl.9
(noting that chemicals, mining and metallurgy, textiles, and food processing had the lowest patent rates of innovations displayed at world fairs from 1851 to 1915, even while the
rates increased over time, because these were the most difficult innovations to copy). But
cf. González-Álvarez & Nieto-Antolı́n, supra note 43, at 290 tbl.4 (concluding Spanish
chemical manufacturing firms use patents and secrecy almost equally).
212 See, e.g., Cohen et al., supra note 165, at 33 tbl.2 (publishing industry consistently
least interested in trade secrecy); Leiponen & Byma, supra note 59, at 1483 tbl.4 (trade
secrecy is not desired at all by transport equipment, furniture, recycling, electricity, and
wholesale trade industry groups); Moser, supra note 162, at 69 (manufacturing machinery
was easier to copy, so that industry witnessed more patents than others, such as the chemical industry).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL206.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 35

why do startups use trade secrets?

27-DEC-18

9:21

785

per se) is the primary driver of innovation, such as the software industry—
value secrecy (along with complexity and lead-time advantage) as important
appropriation methods.213 In this regard, Professor Michael Mattioli, in his
study of big data practices, notes that source code is a prime candidate for
trade secret protection.214 Indeed, David Almeling’s extensive trade secret
litigation studies confirm that software trade secrets are heavily litigated.215
Importantly, none of the aforementioned studies focused on startups. Nonetheless, one would expect that for similar reasons, software startups are likely
to rely heavily on trade secrecy.
Unfortunately, other than the limited data released to date from the
Berkeley Study, there is very little empirical data on the use of trade secrecy
in the biotechnology sector. There has been some investigation of the role
trade secrets play in alliances between firms in the biotechnology industries.
Specifically, several studies have found that relatively strong reliance on trade
secrets can better promote alliances between biotechnology and pharmaceutical companies.216
5.

Collaboration

As just noted, trade secrets may play a role in fostering collaboration in
certain industries. Some studies have investigated across industries whether
collaborative entities prefer trade secrets to patents as a means of protecting
against misappropriation. In this regard, departing employees are often
viewed as the biggest threat.217 After all, by far the most common trade
secret litigation involves the departing employee who runs off with trade
secrets to a competitor or to form a new company.218 Yet, it may not be
213 See Gallié & Legros, supra note 107, at 789 tbl.A.1 (defining “technology push” markets as firms where “innovation has been determined by the dynamics of the technology
itself”).
214 Mattioli notes that “information-based processes” (i.e., big data algorithms) are well
suited for trade secret protection. Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV.
535, 550–51 (2014). In addition, Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Puumalainen speculate that
secrecy should have a significant role in knowledge-intensive fields such as software. See
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Puumalainen, supra note 33, at 107; see also González-Álvarez &
Nieto-Antolı́n, supra note 43, at 285 (noting that “technology” companies tend to choose
“industrial secret”).
215 See Almeling et al., supra note 165, at 60 (indicating that software and technical
know-how remain heavily litigated). Technical trade secrets, like software or computer
programs, are heavily litigated in state courts, although internal business trade secrets,
such as internal business information and customers lists, are more heavily litigated. Id.
216 See Luis Diestre & Nandini Rajagopalan, Are All ‘Sharks’ Dangerous? New Biotechnology
Ventures and Partner Selection in R&D Alliances, 33 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1115, 1132 (2012);
Riitta Katila et al., Swimming with Sharks: Technology Ventures, Defense Mechanisms and Corporate Relationships, 53 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 295, 316 (2008).
217 See Talhiya Sheikh, Trade Secrets and Employee Loyalty, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/sme/en/documents/trade_secrets_employee_loyalty.html (last visited Aug. 20, 2017).
218 See Almeling et al., supra note 161, at 294 (noting that the most common alleged
trade secret misappropriators are employees and business partners).
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surprising that entities that engage in collaborative efforts might prefer patents, because they protect against misappropriation without proof of an
improper act.219 Indeed, Henry Hertzfeld found in a study of United
States–based firms that collaborative entities preferred patents.220
On the other hand, one might reasonably conclude that trust in the
firm’s ability to control information leakage allows trade secrecy to be more
effective. Entities that focus on “[t]acit knowledge,” which generally refers to
“undefined [knowledge]. . . incorporated [in]to the firm’s organisational
routines,”221 might be more comfortable using trade secrecy because of the
difficulty of copying such information, especially when employees are generally loyal.222 Finally, to the extent firms can apply for patents without always
disclosing the “secret sauce” of their inventions, it is possible that both patents and trade secrecy could be used to prevent misappropriation and thus
foster collaboration.223 Which approach collaborative startups prefer—patents, trade secrets, or a complementary blend of patents and trade secrets—is
thus not entirely clear, and thus is of great interest.
6.

Knowledge Spillovers

Even for firms that do not collaborate, there is often fear of knowledge
leakage, which from an economist’s perspective is often viewed as beneficial
knowledge spillovers.224 Exactly how well trade secret protection performs
this function is uncertain based on existing studies. One study of 3900 German industry and service firms found that firms consider patents and secrets
equally important to prevent knowledge spillovers.225 Analyzing the impact
of the passage of the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) on knowledge spillovers across the United States, Png concluded that “the UTSA, by reducing
spillovers, lowered the expected return from R&D, and so, led to less
R&D.”226 Indeed, in their comprehensive study of existing empirical
219 See Arundel, supra note 32, at 622.
220 See Henry R. Hertzfeld et al., Intellectual Property Protection Mechanisms in Research Partnerships, 35 RES. POL’Y 825, 826 (2006).
221 Galende, supra note 159, at 110.
222 See González-Álvarez & Nieto-Antolı́n, supra note 43, at 284; Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Puumalainen, supra note 33.
223 See Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1063, 1088 (2008) (“[A] patentee may often be able to patent an invention and
keep its ‘secret sauce’ a trade secret.”).
224 See Tobias Schmidt, An Empirical Analysis of the Effects of Patents and Secrecy on Knowledge Spillovers 3 (Ctr. for European Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 06-048, 2006),
ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp06048.pdf (noting that firms would not “have an
incentive to invest in the development of new knowledge if all the benefits would spill over
to their competitors”).
225 See id. at 10–11, 19.
226 See Png, supra note 13, at 3. Kultti, Takalo, and Toikka made a related observation
based upon theoretical modeling, noting that “the patent system can simultaneously
increase the spillovers and enhance the incentive to invest in R&D.” Kultti et al., supra note
35, at 37.
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research regarding the impact of covenants not to compete on knowledge
spillovers, Professors Jonathan Barnett and Ted Sichelman—while rejecting
the view that noncompetes necessarily diminish innovation—accepted the
notion that limiting noncompete enforcement increases “the circulation of
R&D personnel.”227 As enforcement of trade secret law, by definition, leads
to less movement of information and personnel, a general theory prevails
that knowledge spillovers—all other factors equal—decrease with the utilization of trade secrecy as an appropriability mechanism.228
7.

Research and Development (R&D)

Conflicting data exists regarding how trade secrecy affects the decisions
of firms to engage in R&D. For example, Professor Aija Leiponen found that
heavy R&D industries rely more on patents and first-mover advantage than
secrecy.229 Consistent with this finding, another study found that trade
secret protection leads to less R&D among low-tech companies,230 and specifically that the emergence of the statutory UTSA leads to a small reduction in
R&D.231
On the other hand, one study found that R&D intensive firms in Germany preferred trade secrecy to other appropriation mechanisms, such as
patents and lead time.232 Another European study similarly found that innovative French firms with large R&D budgets prefer secrecy.233 Although
these results could potentially be explained by the fact that patents are generally perceived to be weaker in Europe than other regions, such as the United
States, the results are certainly in tension with those studies, finding that
minor innovative leaps wind up being protected more by trade secrecy and
major leaps more by patents.234
As Png aptly remarked, “[a]pparently, the impact of trade secrets law
on . . . innovation continues to be an open issue.”235 Given the uncertain
effect of trade secrets on R&D, it is difficult to predict how trade secrets affect
startup R&D, especially relative to other appropriation mechanisms.
227 See Barnett & Sichelman, supra note 104, at 5.
228 Of course, to the extent that trade secrecy promotes the production of knowledge,
weak trade secret law could result in so little knowledge that overall spillovers also
decreased. See id.
229 See Leiponen & Byma, supra note 59, at 1483.
230 See I.P.L. Png, Law and Innovation: Evidence from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 3
(Aug. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), https://nanopdf.com/download/law-and-innovation-evidence-from-the-uniform-trade-secrets-act-ipl-png_pdf (“The impact of the UTSA
[on R&D expenditures] was quite nuanced, being significant among low-tech companies,
but not significant among high-tech companies.”).
231 See Png, supra note 13, at 19.
232 See WAJSMAN & GARCÍA-VALERO, supra note 31, at 8 (finding that German firms’ “use
of trade secrets for protecting innovations is higher than the use of patents”).
233 See Gallié & Legros, supra note 107, at 785, 787.
234 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
235 Png, supra note 13, at 6.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL206.txt

788

8.

unknown

Seq: 38

notre dame law review

27-DEC-18

9:21

[vol. 94:2

Hybrid Strategies

As we discussed earlier, trade secrets are not always a mutually exclusive
option for protecting intellectual assets.236 Yet, there is surprisingly little
empirical study on the broader question of whether firms engage in hybrid
strategies, like complementary patent-trade secret protection, much less what
are the determinants of hybrid strategies.237 As Png notes, most analytical
studies treat trade secrets and patents as substitutes.238 He explains the basic
assumed structure as “[f]irst, the innovator decides on R&D, then, the innovator chooses between patents and secrecy, and finally, the innovator engages
with possible competitors.”239
In this regard, empirical evidence shows that patents are not an effective
tool in any industries, and especially not taken alone. As explained by Hall
and her coauthors: “[C]ompanies appear to use a combination of different
appropriation mechanisms even for the same invention . . . . If patent protection is not available, there is still innovation, albeit innovation that can be
more easily protected by informal mechanisms including secrecy.”240
A study of 250 large, diversified U.S. companies involved in research
partnerships is a good example of this trend.241 Specifically, this study found
that trade secrets were used to protect know-how and tacit knowledge, especially in the “early, negotiating stage of a partnership,”242 but patents were
still ahead of trade secrecy to protect “existing technology (background
knowledge).”243
Nonetheless, the result of little empirical data is a fair amount of theorizing and educated guessing, although not focused on startups.244 Thus,
Hall and her coauthors have suggested that researchers should take a closer
look at patents and trade secrets as complements rather than substitutes.245
Indeed, many of the studies that discuss secrecy do so as an afterthought and
236 See supra Part I (discussing utilizing trade secrecy to extend a lead-time advantage,
patenting a trade secret, utilizing covenants alongside with trade secrets).
237 See Graham, supra note 159, at 6–8; Hall et al., supra note 8, at 411.
238 See Simon & Sichelman, supra note 34, at 377.
239 Png, supra note 230, at 5. González-Álvarez & Nieto-Antolı́n note that high technology may be a hybrid situation where trade secrecy is used during early R&D followed by
patent once developed. See González-Álvarez & Nieto-Antolı́n, supra note 43, at 284; see
also Simon & Sichelman, supra note 34, at 379 (introducing the concept of “data-generating patents” where the data produced can be maintained as a trade secret).
240 Hall et al., The Choice Between, supra note 8, at 419.
241 See Hertzfeld et al., supra note 220, at 830.
242 Id. at 826.
243 Id. at 832.
244 Helmers & Rogers, supra note 42, at 1018.
245 See Hall et al., The Choice Between, supra note 8, at 419 (“It might be worthwhile to
relax the assumption that patents and secrecy are mutually exclusive and to consider a
more complex and realistic scenario in which companies employ different mechanisms to
protect the same invention.”).
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solely use patents as the comparator.246 As such, there is a strong need for
further study on how trade secrets interact with other appropriability mechanisms, especially for startup firms.
9.

Open Questions Remaining from Previous Studies

As we have explained in our extensive review of the trade secrecy empirical literature, many gaps remain in our understanding of the usage of trade
secrets, especially by startups. Of relevance to our study, there are three
major areas ripe for exploration. First, how startups—particularly by industry—decide between the use of trade secrecy and other forms of intellectual
property, such as patents, copyrights, and trademarks, and the role the cost
of IP alternatives plays in this decision.247 Second, whether patents, as well as
other forms of IP, and trade secrets can act as economic complements.248
Third, the extent to which startups use trade secrets to maintain first-mover
advantage, relative to other functions, such as assisting in financing and strategic bargaining.249
III. AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT

OF

STARTUPS

AND

TRADE SECRECY

In this Part, we discuss the results of the Berkeley Patent Survey as they
pertain to trade secrets. As we noted earlier, although some of these results
have previously been published, many have not, nor have any regression analyses been performed on the data.250 As such, and given that the Berkeley
Patent Survey represents the largest dataset on startups and IP assembled to
date, many of the findings presented here are the first comprehensive results
regarding the use of trade secrets by startups.251
246 A notable exception is Mann’s study of software companies. See Mann, supra note
70. In his survey based upon “60 interviews with a variety of professionals knowledgeable
about the software industry,” he explains that “[c]opyrights and trade secrets . . . play an
important role in protecting investments in software. But it is a role weighted in the opposite direction of the role that patents play: copyrights and trade secrets, to the extent they
are useful, tend to support the efforts of large incumbent firms and to hinder the efforts of
smaller entering firms seeking a foothold for competition.” Id. at 966, 1021 (footnotes
omitted).
247 See supra Section II.A (describing the limited data on SMEs and the nonexistent
data on startups per se); subsection II.B.4 (discussing the limited analysis of trade secrecy
usage by industry).
248 See supra subsection II.B.8 (discussing the speculation that trade secrets and patents
may act as complements, but noting the limited empirical support for the assertion).
249 See supra subsection I.A.5 (explaining the view that trade secrets may assist in financing and related activities, but noting the limited empirical support for the view).
250 See supra Introduction (describing the limited results released from 2008 Berkeley
Patent Survey regarding trade secrets).
251 Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1255 (“[T]he 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey [is] the
first comprehensive survey of patenting and entrepreneurship in the United States—summarizing the responses of 1,332 early-stage technology companies founded since 1998.”).
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The Data: The Berkeley Patent Survey

In view of the paucity of information regarding the use of patents, trade
secrets, copyrights, and trademarks by startups, one of the authors
(Sichelman) and other investigators created and administered the first comprehensive survey targeted at U.S. startup and early-stage companies’ use of
intellectual property, particularly patents, and the effects of third-party IP on
those companies. Formally titled “The 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey:
Entrepreneurial Companies and the Patent System,” the survey included a
variety of questions focused not only on patents, but also trade secrets and
other forms intellectual property, as they relate to company innovation, capital formation, business strategies, competition, and alternative forms of intellectual property protection.252
The survey was administered by mail, email, the internet, and telephone
during 2008 to top executives, including CEOs, CTOs, and in-house counsel,
at over 15,000 U.S. companies. Specifically, we253 targeted companies
founded in the United States during the last ten years in the biotechnology,
medical device, software,254 and hardware (including computer, semiconductor, and telecommunications equipment) sectors.255 We drew our sample from two extensive databases—Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) and Thomson’s
VentureXpert (VX)—using both the Standard Industry Classification (SIC)
and North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to identify the
applicable industry sectors of the respondents.256
The survey included about thirty questions.257 As background, the survey asked each company about its business strategy, revenues, number of
employees, innovation focus, and ownership of patents.258 Although much
of the survey focused on patents, the survey included several questions involv252 For a description of the survey’s genesis, including the rigorous process used to
develop and vet the survey, see Graham & Sichelman, supra note 223, at 1091–96.
253 The use of “we” in this Section and the following two Sections generally refers to the
four authors of the Graham et al. article. Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1255 (the authors
are Stuart J.H. Graham, Robert P. Merges, Pam Samuelson, and Ted Sichelman).
254 Because of the large number of software firms founded during the period of interest, the investigators randomly selected 25% of those firms to include in our sample.
255 For companies in the dataset that received venture financing during the last ten
years, over 75% are classified into the primary industries: “information” (61%) and
“health” (15%). For the hardware industry, the investigators included only venture-backed
firms in the dataset.
256 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 148–49 (“Our sample frame was drawn from
two prominent databases—Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) and VentureXpert (VX) (Thomson)—using both the Standard Industry Classification (SIC) and North American Industry
Classification System (NAICS) to identify companies in relevant industries.”).
257 See Graham et al., supra note 7, for a fairly comprehensive list of topics and questions included in the survey.
258 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 149 (“[W]e inquired about each respondent
company’s background, revenues, number of employees, innovation focus, and patent
ownership and use.”).
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ing trade secrets.259 First, the survey asked about the relative importance of
various means to profit from innovation, including patents, copyrights, trade
secrets, trademarks, and non-IP barriers to entry, such as first-mover advantage.260 The survey then asked which of these appropriability mechanisms
was the most important. Specifically, the questions were as follows261:
How important or unimportant is each of the following in your company’s ability to capture competitive advantage from its technology
innovations?

Very
Important

Moderately Slightly
Important Important

Not
Important
At All

a. First-mover
advantage over
competitors
b. Secrecy
b. Patents
c. Copyright
d. Trademarks
e. Difficulty of reverse
engineering
f. Other production,
implementation, or
marketing capabilities
deployed along with
the innovation

Second, the survey inquired about the reasons for not patenting an
innovation, including whether the company “did not want to disclose information.”262 Specifically, the survey asked the following questions263:

259 See generally Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1288–89.
260 See id.
261 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 165. Importantly, the question uses the
term “secrecy” rather than “trade secrecy” so it could compare results to the earlier survey
of large companies by Cohen et al. See Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1291. Thus, the
results may conflate “trade secrecy” with “secrecy.” Specifically, there are various practical
and technical, but nonlegal, means of limiting access to certain (proprietary) information,
such as passwords and digital signatures, technological means of preventing copying, and
eliminating access to information after a particular date. See Hurmelinna-Laukkanen &
Puumalainen, supra note 33, at 97.
262 See generally Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 149 n.221.
263 Id. at 174.
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“For that same unpatented innovation, which if any of the following influenced your company’s decision not to patent?” (Please check ✓ ALL that
apply)

a. Did not want to disclose information
b. Cost of getting the patent, including attorneys’ fees
c. Competitors could have easily invented around the patent
d. Believed that trade secret was adquate protection
e. Cost of enforcing the patent, including actions in court
f. Did not believe the technoloy was patentable
g. No need for legal protection
Which of these was the most important reason not to patent?

Enter a letter ________
In addition to the responses from these questions, in order to gain a
richer understanding of what drove companies to use trade secret protection
(or not) and whether trade secrecy was effective as an appropriability mechanism, we combine company information from the survey about patent holding, revenues, employees, and other characteristics to segment responses and
form the basis of detailed regressions.264
B.
1.

Response Rates and Respondent Characteristics

Survey Response Rates

Overall, the survey response rate for companies actually residing at the
address provided from our data sources is roughly 12%—specifically, about
11% for Dun & Bradstreet (D&B) firms and 17% for Venture Expert (VX)
companies.265 Within industries, the response rate for D&B biotechnology
and medical device companies was about 24% (105 responses total); for VX
biotechnology and medical device companies, 24% (139 responses); for D&B
software companies, 9% (535 responses); and for VX software and hardware
companies, 16% (242 responses). Although these response rates may seem
somewhat low, they are quite typical for surveys of small companies.266
264 See infra subsection III.C.1.d.
265 These response rates are adjusted for companies that we presumed to have moved
or disbanded based on bad addresses and disconnected phone numbers. For additional
discussion of response rates, see Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1271–72.
266 See JOSEPH J. CORDES ET AL., A SURVEY OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY FIRMS 10–11 (1999)
(reporting response rates of 3.8% to 31% on small firm surveys).
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Indeed, given that the majority of the respondents were CEOs and CTOs,
whose time is usually in high demand, the response rates are respectable.267
Of course, any potentially low response rates raise the possibility for bias and
skew, which we discuss in the next subsection.
2.

Characteristics of Respondents

Using data from D&B, Thomson’s VX, and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, we compared several different characteristics of our respondent
and nonrespondent samples.268 Specifically, we examined attributes such as
age, size, geographic location, and number of patents held and, when available, annual revenue and features of the company’s venture funding.269 Generally, any differences in these characteristics are not statistically significant at
conventional levels.270 Some notable exceptions are company location (in
general, the respondents were located more in the western United States,
especially the West Coast), and respondent medical device companies tended
to have fewer employees than nonrespondents.271 There are also differences
in patenting rates and revenues—notably in the software sector, which suggest that higher-patenting, higher-revenue companies were more likely to
respond—although not at statistically significant levels.272 Despite these
exceptions, the overall findings of little to no significant difference in company age, size, and patenting suggest that the respondents are fairly representative of the entire sample of companies.273
267 See id.
268 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 150 (“Using data from Dun & Bradstreet,
Thomson’s VentureXpert, and the U.S. Patent Office, we were able to compare several
different variables of our respondent and non-respondent samples.”).
269 See id. (“We tested the mean statistics on attributes such as age, size, geographic
location, and patents held—and, when available, annual revenue and features of the company’s venture funding.”).
270 See id. (“Generally, the differences in these variables are not statistically significant
at conventional levels.”).
271 Medical device respondents in the D&B sample had an average of fourteen employees versus thirty-eight employees among the nonrespondents (significant at the 90% confidence interval). However, this difference is primarily driven by large outliers; at the
median, our respondent medical device firms have the same number of employees as our
nonrespondents (five).
272 Issued patents were calculated by examining and comparing data supplied from
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office databases current through July 22, 2008. See Official
Gazette for Patents, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/learning-andresources/official-gazette/official-gazette-patents (last visited Sept. 28, 2018). We also
examined the number of published patent applications starting in the year 2001 using the
same data. See id.
273 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 151 (“Despite these exceptions, our overall
findings of little to no significant difference in age, size, and patenting suggest that our
respondent companies are not different from the entire random sample of companies, at
least in terms of these important characteristic attributes.”).
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It is important to recognize, too, that “any bias in our sample is likely
present—and in many instances to a greater degree—in previous surveys.”274
Indeed, no previous survey recounted earlier examined characteristics of
their respondent sample against their nonrespondent sample.275 For example, the frequently cited Carnegie Mellon (Cohen et al.) and Yale (Levin et
al.) surveys noted earlier—although having response rates of about 50%—
disclosed no analysis comparing company size, revenues, market capitalization, patenting rates, or other important characteristics of respondents with
nonrespondents.276
Finally, as another test for bias, we employed a variety of statistical methods to compare the results of the responses we received in response to hardcopy mailings and emails (approximately 1200) and those responding to a
telephone campaign (approximately 130).277 In this regard, in the first
phase of contacting companies, we only used mail and email; thus, the companies responding by phone are initial nonrespondents.278 Moreover,
unlike our mail and email respondents, most of the telephone-based respondents received (and, to a large degree, required) a gift certificate “prize” for
completing the survey.279 Overall, we found no statistically significant differences between the responses of these two groups—including comparisons
just of software firms, which had the lowest response rates.280 Given these
findings, we do not view the differences in background characteristics
reported above as problematic.281
C.

The Results: The Use of Trade Secrets by Startups Highly Varies

In what follows, we first provide descriptive results of the relevant survey
responses—overall as well as segmented by a variety of important company
characteristics, such as industry, company age, and size of patent portfolio.282
Then, we perform several regressions on the results to pinpoint those factors
274 Id. at 151.
275 Id.
276 Id. at 151–52.
277 Id. at 152.
278 We contacted the original set of respondents by email and standard mail from June
to August 2008, then called about 13% of the nonrespondents beginning in September
2008.
279 After testing, we determined that a large share of the telephoned sample needed to
be motivated by a guaranteed “prize”—in this case, a $25–50 gift certificate for Amazon—
to take the survey.
280 Sichelman & Graham, supra note 58, at 152 (“Importantly, based on our testing to
date, we have found no statistically significant differences between the responses of these
two groups—including comparisons just of software firms, which had the lowest response
rates.”).
281 Id. at 152 (“Given these findings, we believe that we have by and large insulated
ourselves from the charge that differences in background characteristics reported above
are problematic.”).
282 See infra subsection III.C.1.c.
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and company characteristics that drive the use (and non-use)—as well as general effectiveness—of trade secrets among startups.283
1.

Descriptive Results
a.

Importance of Trade Secrecy Relative to Other Appropriability
Mechanisms

As noted in Part II, previous surveys found that trade secrecy was often
more important for large companies that many other appropriability mechanisms.284 Prior to the Berkeley Patent Survey, there was no systematic investigation of whether this result held for startups.285
FIGURE 1: IMPORTANCE OF APPROPRIABILITY MECHANISMS
(4 = very important; 3 = moderately important; 2 = slightly
important; 1 = not important at all)
How important or unimportant is each of the following in your company’s
ability to capture competitive advantage from its technology innovations?

As shown in Figure 1, secrecy was the third most important
appropriability mechanism for biotechnology companies with a rating of 3.16
(slightly more “moderately important”).286 However, while patents and firstmover advantage had nominally higher scores, the differences were not statistically significant.287 Additionally, it is clear that secrecy provided a greater
advantage to biotech startups than mere reverse engineering, which was
rated a 2.52 (between “moderately” and “slightly” important).288 Similarly,
283 See infra subsection III.C.2.
284 See supra Section II.A.
285 See supra Introduction.
286 Figure 1 shows the results for the Dun & Bradstreet respondents, which represent
the “population” of companies in our sample. See Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1269.
The VentureXpert respondents showed very similar variation. See id. at 1270 & n.45.
287 See supra Figure 1.
288 See supra Figure 1.
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for medical device companies, secrecy stood just behind first-mover advantage and patents—and greatly exceeded the value of reverse engineering.289
Thus, for startup biomedical companies, the importance of secrecy to capture competitive advantage was paramount.290
Within the software industry, however, secrecy was significantly less
important than first-mover advantage, copyright, and other production,
implementation, or marketing capabilities.291 Secrecy was roughly of the
same importance as trademarks and the difficulty of reverse engineering (the
latter of which is intuitive and should be of similar importance, since a major
factor in keeping client-based software innovations secret is the difficulty of
reverse engineering them, and reverse engineering is one of the primary
ways to relinquish a trade secret). Yet, secrecy was more important than patents for respondents in the software industry.292
These results are notable for two reasons. First, they show significant
variation among startups by industry. In biotechnology, trade secrecy is critical, but much less so for software. This is sensible given that many biotechnology inventions—especially processes—can easily be kept secret.293 In this
regard, respondents reported that when deciding not to patent inventions,
when the invention was a process, 41% of the time this was because trade
secrecy was adequate, but for product inventions, trade secrecy was adequate
only 34% of the time.294 Software, on the other hand, is much more susceptible to reverse engineering—whether simply by examining functionality or
by so-called decompiling to recreate source code.295
Interestingly, despite the ease with which software can be reverse engineered—hence, diminishing the importance of trade secrecy—as well as the
reported ineffectiveness of patenting, software companies still relied heavily
on first-mover advantage.296 Thus, network effects, branding, client relationships, and other barriers to entry must play stronger roles than patents or
289 Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1291 & n.112 (“For medical device startups and
venture-backed IT hardware companies, respondents rank patenting second, behind firstmover advantage.”).
290 Cf. id. at 1291 & n.113 (“For this group of firms, patenting is ranked as the most
important means of capturing competitive advantage.”).
291 These differences are significant at a 99% confidence level (first-mover advantage)
and a 90% confidence level (copyright and other production, implementation, or marketing capabilities).
292 This difference is significant at a 99% confidence level.
293 Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1313 (“Biotechnology firms are also more likely to
believe that trade secret is an adequate means of protecting their innovations . . . .”).
294 See infra Appendix, Figure A1. These differences are statistically significant at a 99%
confidence level.
295 See, e.g., Erika Danielle Norman, Weak Overseas Protection for American Software Patents:
The Need for a Congressional Response to Microsoft Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 8 CHI.-KENT J.
INTELL. PROP. 111, 134 (2008) (“[I]t is not possible to reverse-engineer genetic code (as it
is computer software) through the use of instructions . . . .”).
296 See supra Figure 1.
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trade secrecy in cementing first-mover advantage for software startups.297
Additionally, like patents, these results support the view that trade secrecy
usage is industry specific.298
Second, these results show important differences from the previous
large-company surveys. For instance, in the Cohen et al. survey, secrecy was
ranked as more important than patenting even for pharmaceutical and biotechnology companies.299 In contrast, for biotech startups, patenting was at
least of equal importance to secrecy. Although earlier large-company studies
did not focus on software companies, they did survey electronics hardware
companies, such as those in the semiconductor industry.300 Like healthcare
startups, IT hardware firms rated secrecy as more important than patenting
in the earlier surveys.301 However, for venture-backed IT hardware startups
in the Berkeley Patent Study, patenting was at least as important as
secrecy.302
b.

Trade Secrets and Patents as Substitutes or Complements?

As recounted earlier, there is a vigorous debate among theorists and
conflicting results in the empirical studies as to whether trade secrets and
patents act as economic substitutes or complements.303 The responses here
can help answer that question—at least as to startups—because we can measure the relative importance of patents and trade secrets as a company’s patent portfolio grows in size. Additionally, we can measure the extent to which
disclosure is a reason for not applying for a patent, across and between
industries.
297 See Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 699, 830 (1978) (Pitofsky, Comm’r, concurring) (contending that “pronounced consumer brand loyalty is a barrier to entry”); Mark A. Lemley
& David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 491
(1998) (noting that “[c]omputer software is the paradigm example” of a “virtual” network
effect).
298 See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1650 (2003) (contending that patent law is applied in an industry-specific manner).
There is a dire need for understanding industry-specific application of doctrine, especially
in trade secrecy. See Philip Craft, David Levine Speaks at Two Forums on Information, Technology and Media, ELON U. (May 29, 2013), http://www.elon.edu/e-net/Article/72117?s=/
Law/news/enet_navigation (reporting on a presentation by one of the authors (Levine)
regarding the “potential for future conflict between people seeking information in various
fields (finance, media, energy, etc.) and firms who wish to preserve the secrecy of their
methods”).
299 See Cohen et al., supra note 165, at 10, 13, 40 fig.1.
300 Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1290–92 (“[I]n the 1994 Carnegie-Mellon Survey, IT
hardware firms (such as semiconductors and communications equipment) reported that
patenting was only effective at protecting about one-quarter of their product innovations,
compared with secrecy, which was effective at protecting about one-half.”).
301 See id. at 1291–92.
302 See id. at 1292 & n.118. (“While the average importance given to patents is greater
than that of secrecy, the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels.”)
303 See supra Parts I–II.
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Specifically, Figure 2 shows the relationship between the number of patents held by a company and the importance reported for each of the four
appropriability mechanisms: patents, reverse engineering, secrecy, and firstmover advantage. Critically, the importance of secrecy increases with number
of patents held. For instance, the average importance of secrecy for companies with no patents (mean = 2.47) is significantly less than for those with 100
to 200 patents (mean = 3.33) and with over 300 patents (mean = 4.00).304 In
addition, for respondents with no patents, secrecy is less important than firstmover advantage, roughly the same importance as the difficulty of reverse
engineering, and more important than patents.305 For those with 100 to 200
patents, secrecy is less important than patenting, less important than reverse
engineering, and roughly the same importance as first-mover advantage.306
For those companies with more than 300 patents, the importance of patents,
secrecy, and first-mover advantage were all reported as “very important”
(mean = 4.00), while reverse engineering was least important (mean =
2.00).307
These results are important because they provide support for the theory
that patents and trade secrets may act as a complements, at least for companies that hold many patents. Further supporting this view, in Figure A1
304 This difference is significant at a 99% confidence level.
305 For respondents with no patents, the difference between the average importance of
secrecy and the average importance of first-mover advantage is statistically significant at a
99% confidence level. Therefore, for respondents with no patents, there is no statistically
significant difference in importance between secrecy and the importance of the difficulty
in reverse engineering.
306 For respondents with 100 to 200 patents, the difference between the average importance of secrecy and the average importance of patents, and the difference between the
average importance of secrecy and the average importance of the difficulty of reverse engineering are statistically significant at a 99% confidence level.
307 See supra Figure 2 (showing these results).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\94-2\NDL206.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 49

27-DEC-18

why do startups use trade secrets?

9:21

799

(Appendix) we report that the companies that marked “trade secrecy as adequate” and “did not want to disclose information” as the most important reason not to patent a recent invention held more patents than companies
reporting other reasons (such as cost).308 What the results do not show is
whether this complementary relationship is one that exists prior to patenting,
after patenting, or both. However, as we show in our regression analysis, a
major driver affecting the importance of patenting for companies is the
importance of trade secrecy and vice-versa, and this relationship is not
affected by company age, size, or revenue.309 Although not determinative,
this result indicates that the complementary relationship exists both prior to
and after patenting.310 At the same time, our results also show that patents
and trade secrets may—per the traditional model—act as substitutes.311 Specifically, Figure 3 shows seven factors that may have influenced the respondent company’s last decision not to patent, segmented by industry.312
FIGURE 3: REASONS NOT

TO

PATENT

BY

INDUSTRY TYPE

For that same unpatented innovation, which if any of the following
influenced your company’s decision not to patent?

As shown in Figure 3, firms in all industries report that they, at least in
part, decided not to patent a recent invention because “trade secre[cy] was
adequate protection” and they “did not want to disclose information” in a
308
309
310
311
312
dence

These differences are significant at a 99% confidence level.
See infra subsection III.C.2.
See infra subsection III.C.2.
See supra Section I.A.
The difference in the percentages shown in Figure 3 are significant to a 99% confilevel.
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patent. Specifically, roughly 45–48% of companies in the biotechnology,
medical device, and IT hardware industries, and 29% of software companies,
reported that trade secrecy was adequate. Nearly 59% of biotech companies
reported that they did not patent a previous invention because they did not
want to disclose information, followed by 50% of IT hardware companies,
45.5% of medical device companies, and 25% of software companies. The
results indicate that, at least in many situations, patents and trade secrets
function as substitutes.
Thus, as more sophisticated theories have posited, our data lends support to the claim that trade secrets may function both as substitutes and as
complements, depending on the circumstances at hand.313
c.

“New” vs. “Old” Startups

There is some evidence that as a company matures, it becomes less
dependent on patents and more dependent on trade secrecy.314 Because
our sample of companies essentially ranged from zero to ten years old, we
examined whether the respondents changed their ratings of appropriability
mechanisms by the age of the company.315
FIGURE 4: YEAR COMPANY FOUNDED COMPARED TO
APPROPRIABILITY MECHANISMS

THE

IMPORTANCE

OF

Specifically, Figure 4 shows the relationship between the year a company
was founded and the importance it gives to each of the four appropriability
mechanisms: patents, reverse engineering, secrecy, and first-mover advantage. In general, respondents gave the same average importance to secrecy
313 See Simon & Sichelman, supra note 34, at 383–84 (positing patents and trade secrets
as both substitutes and complements).
314 See supra subsection II.B.4.
315 See infra Figure 4.
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regardless of their age group.316 In addition, respondents generally assigned
secrecy the same relative importance—less than first-mover advantage, similar to patents, and more than the difficulty of reverse engineering—across all
three age groups.317 Thus, it appears that, at least among young companies,
there is little change from initial founding as the company matures. Similarly, we find that from the smallest to the largest startups—as measured by
the number of employees—trade secrecy remains of about equal importance.318 On the other hand, unlike segmenting companies by age, patents
generally become less important relative to trade secrecy as a company’s
number of employees grow.319 Thus, it appears that size may matter more
than age in determining the relative importance of patents and trade secrets,
as well as other forms of intellectual property.320
d.

Important of Secrecy by Business Model

Presumably, companies primarily providing services are less concerned
with trade secrets than companies providing products. On the other hand,
scholars have generally viewed companies licensing inventions to rely more
heavily on patenting than trade secrecy, because as we noted earlier, Arrow’s
information disclosure paradox holds that it is impossible to license absent
disclosure (which, absent a nondisclosure agreement, would destroy
secrecy).321 However, to the extent that Burstein is correct that information
in licensing deals can be disclosed in layers, trade secrecy would still play a
critical role.322

316 This similarity is significant at a 90% confidence level.
317 The difference between the importance of secrecy and the importance of firstmover advantage, and the difference between the importance of secrecy and the importance of reverse engineering are statistically significant at a 99% confidence level across all
three age groups. The difference between the importance of secrecy and the importance
of patents is not significant in any age group except for companies founded before 2000.
318 See infra Appendix, Figure A3.
319 See infra Appendix, Figure A3.
320 See infra Appendix, Figure A3.
321 See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying text.
322 See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
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Figure 5 shows the relationship between the proportion of revenue a
company derives from each of three sources—selling products, selling services, and licensing technologies—and the corresponding importance such
companies give to secrecy as an appropriability mechanism. Of companies
deriving a majority of their revenue from a single source, those deriving most
of their revenue from licensing technologies considered secrecy to be more
important on average than companies deriving most of their revenue from
selling products.323 Companies deriving most of their revenue from selling
products considered secrecy to be more important on average than companies deriving most of their revenue from selling services.324
In this regard, the proportion of revenue derived from selling products
has no real correlation with the importance of secrecy.325 On the other
hand, the importance of secrecy has a weak but statistically significant inverse
correlation with the proportion of company revenue derived from selling services; as the proportion of revenue derived from selling services increases,
the importance of secrecy decreases. Conversely, the importance of secrecy
has a weak but statistically significant positive correlation with the proportion
of company revenue derived from licensing technologies; as the proportion
of revenue derived from licensing technologies increases, so too does the
importance of secrecy.
These findings are important in two major ways. First, they support the
view that trade secrecy is more important to product-focused companies than
service-focused companies. In this regard, other results show that for startups deriving most of their revenue from product sales, there is no statisti323
324
325

This difference is significant at a 99% confidence level.
This difference is significant at a 99% confidence level.
The p-value of interest is 0.40.
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cally significant difference between the importance of patents and the
importance of trade secrets.326
Second, and perhaps most importantly, these findings support the
importance of trade secrets to companies engaged in licensing. Indeed,
other data shows that for startups deriving most of their revenue from licensing, there is no statistically significant difference between the importance of
patents and the importance of trade secrets.327 As such, this finding is in
some tension with Arrow’s information disclosure paradox—since it is clear
that not all licensees will sign nondisclosure agreements—and lends support
to Burstein’s view that information can be disclosed in layers.328
2.

Regression Models

Here, in order to pinpoint the drivers of trade secrecy usage and effectiveness, we employ multivariate ordered logistic regression techniques.329
Specifically, because mere descriptive results may be explained by other variables, we construct a set of explanatory variables to test against the results of
the survey questions. We first describe those variables, then the results of our
regression models.330
a.

Explanatory Variables

There are many factors that could influence trade secrecy usage and
effectiveness among startups. For instance, as already seen in the descriptive
statistics, results varied by industry, number of patents held, innovation type
(product or process), and business model (product, process, or licensing).
We use these and a variety of other explanatory variables. Additional variables include company age, funder types, number of employees, revenue,
and business strategy. These and other variables, including those representing responses, are described in Table 1 below.
326 The p-value for this difference is approximately 0.64.
327 The p-value for this difference is approximately 0.64.
328 See supra notes113–19 and accompanying text. An alternative hypothesis is that
licenses involving less valuable information can rely on trade secrecy for protection, while
licenses involving more valuable information must rely on patents (or other mechanisms)
for protection. We thank Michael Risch for this suggestion. Although our results do not
rule out this alternative hypothesis, all other factors equal, they nonetheless lend support
to Burstein’s view that Arrow’s information disclosure paradox may not always hold, at least
as traditionally conceived.
329 We thank Shawn P. Miller, Intellectual Property Research Fellow at Stanford Law
School, for his assistance in performing the regressions.
330 The two dependent variables we utilize in our analysis—the importance of secrecy
and the importance of patents—each possess more than two ordinal values and the Likertscale values (1, 2, 3 or 4) possess a meaningful sequential order. Accordingly, we use the
ordered logit model in our regressions. See generally Peter McCullagh, Regression Models for
Ordinal Data, 42 J. ROYAL STAT. SOC’Y. 109 (1980).
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SURVEY RESPONSE VARIABLES

Description
Age of company in 2008
The company was funded by angel investors
The company was funded by commercial banks (credit,
loans)
complementassets Importance of other production, implementation, or
marketing capabilities as appropriability mechanisms
copyright
Importance of copyright as an appropriability
mechanism
employs
Number of employees at the end of 2007
firstmover
Importance of first mover advantage as an
appropriability mechanism
friendsfunded
The company was funded by friends and family
ibankfunded
The company was funded by investment banks
ind
Combined (VX and DB) industry indicator
licenseout
Percent share of revenue from licensing tech
numpatents
Number of patents held
otherfunded
The company was funded by other companies as
investors
patents
Importance of patents as an appropriability mechanism
revenue
Revenue in millions of dollars
reverseeng
Importance of the difficulty of reverse engineering as an
appropriability mechanism
secrecy
Importance of secrecy as an appropriability mechanism
sellprod
Percent share of revenue from selling products
sellservice
Percent share of revenue from selling services
shareeng
Percent share of employees that were engineers
strategydesign
Importance of design innovation to business strategy
strategymodel
Importance of business model innovation to business
strategy
strategyprocess
Importance of process/internal tools innovation to
business strategy
strategyprod
Importance of product innovation to business strategy
trademarks
Importance of trademarks as an appropriability
mechanism
vcfunded
The company was funded by venture capital investors
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Regression Results
a.

General Trends

We began by measuring the relationship between numerous variables
and the rating of the importance of secrecy (on the 1–4 scale) in obtaining
competitive advantage for a company’s innovations. In the first model, we
did not control for industry or funding type.331
TABLE 2: THE IMPORTANCE

OF

SECRECY: REGRESSION MODEL 1

Field Name
patents
firstmover
reverseeng
strategyprod
trademarks
complementassets
copyright
strategydesign
strategyprocess
shareeng
strategymodel
employs
evenue
agein2008
sellservice
sellprod

Coeff332
0.55***
0.56***
0.36***
0.15
-0.00
0.23***
0.07
0.13*
0.34***
0.32
-0.13
0.001
1.9e-7
0.026
-0.22
-0.43*

As shown in Table 1, many explanatory variables were statistically significant.333 For instance, companies that ranked patents higher also ranked
331 Because not all respondents answered all of the questions related to the variables in
Table 1, we ran six different models, omitting number of patents, percentage share of
revenue from licensing technology, percentage share from selling a service, and percentage share from selling a product in various combinations in each model. The table
reported here includes percentage share from selling a service and percentage share from
selling a product. The other models are available in the Appendix, with results that are
substantially the same as those presented here.
332 Here, the stars indicate statistical significance at least a 99% confidence level (***),
95% confidence level (**), and 90% confidence level (*).
333 Because we performed cross-sectional regressions, there is very likely to be some
endogeneity between our dependent and independent variables—namely, that the value
of trade secrecy likely drives the value of some of our independent variables. For instance,
the value of trade secrecy may itself increase the value of patenting, or allow more employees to be hired. Thus, our regressions cannot be interpreted in a wholly causal fashion.
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trade secrecy higher. This is strong support for the view that trade secrets
and patents can function as economic complements. On the other hand,
there was no statistically significant relationship between the importance of
trade secrecy and the importance of copyrights and trademarks, indicating
that these forms of IP may not act as complements (or substitutes for that
matter) for trade secrets.
Additionally, companies that rated first-mover advantage, the difficulty
of reverse engineering, and complementary assets higher on average also
rated trade secrecy higher. These results help to confirm the traditional
model that views trade secrecy as important to maintaining first-mover advantage for difficult-to-reverse-engineer innovations. These results hold even for
larger companies that rate highly the importance of complementary assets,
such as marketing muscle, access to capital, and production capabilities.
Indeed, there was no statistically significant relationship between revenue,
the number of employees, or age and how a company rated the importance
of trade secrecy.
Next, the regressions show business strategy is significantly related to the
importance of trade secrecy. Those companies that ranked design and process innovation higher rated trade secrecy higher, while there was weak evidence that those companies earning revenue primarily from products rated
trade secrecy lower. These results comport with the general understanding
that process innovations are better protected through trade secrecy.334 Consistent with our descriptive findings, companies that mainly earned revenue
from licensing showed an increase in reliance on trade secrets, though there
were too few data points for this finding to be statistically significant.335
In an alternative model, we added dummies for the four industries of
interest, with the statistically significant result that software companies tend
to rate trade secrecy as less important.336 In yet another model, we
examined whether the type of funding was related to whether a respondent
company rated trade secrecy as more important. Specifically, we found weak
evidence that when controlling for factors other than industry, traditional
Nonetheless, the results show general, empirical relationships between potential explanatory factors and the role of trade secrecy in technology startups and thus provide valuable
insight into the likely causal mechanisms underlying the importance of trade secrecy.
334 See supra notes 197–200 and accompanying text. Earlier we reported that productbased companies rated trade secrecy as more important than service-based companies. See
supra notes 322–23 and accompanying text. The finding here relates not to the type of
revenue derived by the company, but rather to its types of innovations. Thus, a productbased company will typically generate both product-based innovations (i.e., in the product
itself) and process-based innovations (e.g., in manufacturing), and the result here shows
that trade secrecy was rated as more important for process innovations than product
innovations.
335 See infra Appendix, Table A2.
336 See infra Appendix, Table A3. Results were significant at a 95% or greater confidence interval. On the other hand, we found no statistically significant relationship
between the medical device, IT hardware, and biotech industries and the importance of
trade secrecy, though this simply could reflect too small a sample size for these industries.
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venture capital firms found trade secrecy to be less important to their investment decisions.337 Because most companies funded by venture capital (VC)
firms in our sample were software companies, this result probably more
affirms the lesser importance of trade secrets for software startups than indicates a general lack of concern for trade secrets by VCs across all industries.
Yet, at least for software startups in 2008, VCs appeared much more concerned about patents than trade secrets.338 In the wake of substantial restrictions on the patenting of software erected by recent U.S. Supreme Court
decisions, these results could very well be different today.339
b.

Secrecy vs. Patenting

Our results in the previous section underscore that patents and trade
secrets can act as economic complements. In order to better understand
how patents and trade secrets can act as economic substitutes, we analyzed
how key explanatory variables related to trade secrecy affected respondent
company reporting regarding the importance of patents.340

337 See infra Appendix, Table A5. This result was significant at a 90% or a greater confidence level. There were no statistically significant relationships between the importance of
trade secrecy and whether the respondent company was funded by an investment bank,
commercial bank, angel investors, or family and friends. Like our industry results, this
could simply reflect the relatively low sample size for these entities.
338 See Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1280 (“[V]enture investors are interested in patents, and venture-capital backed companies are much more likely to hold and file for
patents.”).
339 See supra notes 45–54 and accompanying text.
340 Because not all respondents answered all of the questions related to the variables in
Table 2, like the previous regressions, we ran six different models, omitting number of
patents, percentage share of revenue from licensing technology, percentage share from
selling a service, and percentage share from selling a product in various combinations in
each model. The table reported here includes percentage share from selling a service and
percentage share from selling a product. The other models are available in the Appendix,
with results that are substantially the same as those presented here.
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PATENTING: REGRESSION MODEL

Field Name
secrecy
firstmover
reverseeng
strategyprod
trademarks
complementassets
copyright
strategydesign
strategyprocess
shareeng
strategymodel
employs
revenue
agein2008
sellservice
sellprod

Coeff
0.69***
0.27***
0.25***
0.49***
0.45***
-0.13
-0.08
0.008
0.017
0.59**
-0.01
0.00
-1.8e-7
-0.017
-2.40***
-1.36***

Interestingly, the most important factor for a company in rating patents
as relatively important was whether the company rated trade secrecy as
important. This finding is consistent with our descriptive findings that—at
least portfolio-wide—patenting and trade secrecy act as complements.
Yet, we showed earlier that for a single innovation, not wanting to disclose information and using trade secrecy were important reasons companies
identified for forgoing patenting. Thus, our results support the view that
trade secrets can act both as complements (at a portfolio level) and as substitutes (at an innovation level). Of course, this does not rule out that trade
secrets can act as complements even at the innovation level, but further
research is needed to confirm or reject such a phenomenon.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR RESULTS: THE VARIED
USES OF TRADE SECRETS
Here, we make some initial observations regarding the theoretical and
empirical implications of our results. To be certain, these are not the only
implications of our results, but ones that are novel, important findings in the
ongoing and increasingly complex debate over the role of trade secrecy in
industry and society.
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The Role of Trade Secrecy in Promoting First-Mover Advantage

As we explained earlier, one of the primary reasons for trade secret use
is to maintain lead-time advantage.341 Our results provide mixed support for
this theoretical observation. For biotechnology startups, secrecy, patents,
and first-mover advantage were indistinguishable statistically.342 This provides some support for the view that trade secrecy, along with patents, effectively extend first-mover advantage in order to secure supracompetitive
profits in the marketplace.343
On the other hand, for software startups, secrecy ranked more important than the other three forms of intellectual property law protection—
copyrights, patents, and trademarks—but significantly lagged behind firstmover advantage as a means to capture advantage from innovation.344
Remarkably, startups in the software space do not view trade secrecy as synonymous with first-mover advantage, a result that flies in the face of the general
assumption that trade secrecy is the engine of the first-mover advantage.345
Yet, as noted earlier, continuous advancement over competitors, network
effects, branding benefits, and other barriers to entry can lead to similar leadtime advantages.346 This finding is important, as it lends some support for
the view that robust trade secret protection is unnecessary in fields where
software plays an important role, and calls into question the received wisdom
of trade secrecy as a uniform, necessary prerequisite to all innovation.347
Because startups do not necessarily view secrecy as a prerequisite to leadtime advantages, further study is needed to determine how firms understand
the relationship between first-mover advantage and trade secrecy. More
broadly, if secrecy is not as big a part of first-mover advantage as previously
assumed—and other forms of IP, such as patents, do not take its place—then
“open source” business models and other information diffusion innovation
strategies may have more currency.348 Thus, it is not surprising that our findings only indicate substantial variation between secrecy and first-mover
advantage for software companies, for which open source business models,
network effects, and other mechanisms are more likely to lead to competitive
advantage than for biotech, medical device, and IT hardware companies.349
341 See supra subsection I.A.1.
342 See supra subsection I.A.1.
343 See supra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.
344 See supra Figure 1.
345 See Hurmelinna-Laukkanen & Puumalainen, supra note 33, at 103.
346 See supra subsection II.B.3.
347 See, e.g., David S. Levine, Confidentiality Creep and Opportunistic Privacy, 20 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 11, 39 (2017) (contending that, in the aftermath of the alleged
Russian interference with the 2016 U.S. presidential election, there is a need for public
access to the algorithmic code (i.e., software) used by Facebook, in order to understand
how much information was actually shared and how to prevent such interference in the
future).
348 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
349 See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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Trade Secrets and Patents as Substitutes and Complements

As we discussed earlier, another major finding involves trade secrecy
both as a substitute and as a complement to the expensive patent.350 As a
general matter, trade secret scholarship has assumed a substitute relationship
between trade secrets and patents, with the result that—all other factors
being equal—firms will choose trade secrecy over patents because of the
higher costs associated with acquiring a patent.351 Such a view is consistent
with the findings of the large-company surveys of Cohen et al. and Levin et
al., which generally showed a preference for secrecy over patenting.352
One would assume this effect would be even more pronounced for startups, given that they often lack adequate financing, rendering the cost of
patenting prohibitively expensive.353 To a notable extent, our results seem
to confirm this basic logic. The cost of obtaining a patent is the leading
reason for not acquiring one; indeed, in the case of software startups, 63.5%
listed it as a reason for forgoing patenting.354 This finding is at first blush in
tension with the finding that a little over 29% of those same software startups
indicated that trade secrecy was adequate protection.355 Nonetheless, it
would seem that many startups, faced with the choice of patenting or not,
may choose trade secrecy by default (even if they do not identify their nonpatented information as such).356 In other words, for many startups, particularly in the software industry, trade secrecy may not be viewed as adequate,
but it will have to do given the alternative of a cost-prohibitive patent.
But an alternative explanation, and another major finding of this study,
is the possibility that startups view trade secrecy and patents as complements
rather than substitutes.357 There are at least three possibilities here. First,
startups use trade secrecy and patents in tandem for the same information
and ideas, based on how best it might be protected at a given stage of development (i.e., research and development versus marketing).358 Second, to
the extent that not all information concerning an invention must be disclosed in a patent, companies can simultaneously protect the same invention
via a patent and trade secret.359 Last, as one of us has suggested elsewhere, a
350 See supra subsection III.C.1.b.
351 See subsection I.A.3.
352 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
353 See Graham et al., supra note 7, at 1310–11.
354 See supra Figure 3.
355 See supra Figure 3.
356 To that end, it should be noted that “believed trade secret was adequate protection”
and “did not want to disclose information” had similar propensities among the variables in
foregoing patents. See supra Figure 3. Thus, it would seem that respondents seemed to
understand that trade secrecy and preventing disclosure are correlated. That said, biotech
startups were more interested in secrecy, it seems, given that it was a higher percentage
answer than the cost of patenting in foregoing patents. See supra Figure 3. These results
warrant further study and should be tested in future work.
357 See supra subsection III.C.1.b.
358 See Esmond et al., supra note 49, at 4; supra text accompanying note 49.
359 See supra note 89.
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company with a “data-generating patent” can patent a means of collecting
data, then protect the data itself via a trade secret.360
To the extent that trade secrets may provide an additional layer of protection to patented inventions, this is another result that warrants further
study, particularly given the new federal trade secret law, the DTSA, and its
potential to increase the profile of trade secrecy as a litigation and remedial
avenue.361
C.

Trade Secrets as Strategic IP Assets

Finally, our results indicate that trade secrecy is viewed among companies as enabling licensing revenue and strategic bargaining leverage for startups, supporting the theoretical view that trade secrets can function like
traditional intellectual property.362 This finding is supported not only
directly, but also in a variety of other responses. For instance, among companies that derive their revenue from a single source, those deriving most of
their revenue from licensing considered secrecy as more important than
those who primarily generate revenue through product sales.363 Indeed, the
weak but significant positive correlation between the increasing proportion
of revenue generated from licensing and trade secrecy provides empirical
support for the claim that, like patents, trade secrets can act as important
components in setting the boundaries of technology firms.364 As noted earlier, the findings help support Burstein’s claim that trade secrets play a central role in protecting firms negotiating with other firms over information
assets and, that contrary to Arrow’s information disclosure paradox, trade
secrets can allow information to be disclosed in layers so as to prevent
expropriation.365
360 See Simon & Sichelman, supra note 34, at 379.
361 See generally Levine & Seaman, supra note 3.
362 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 313 (“I suggest that trade secrets can be justified as a
form, not of traditional property, but of intellectual property. . . . Granting legal protection
for those new inventions not only encourages their creation, but enables an inventor to sell
her idea.”).
363 See supra Figure 5.
364 See Dan L. Burk & Brett H. McDonnell, The Goldilocks Hypothesis: Balancing Intellectual Property Rights at the Boundary of the Firm, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 575, 608 (“Trade secrets
are valuable and frequently critical information to the functioning of firms, and are likely
to be among the most firm-specific of intellectual assets—specialized processes, customer
lists, business plans, and other information integral to the firm.”).
365 See supra notes 113–19 and accompanying text. On the other hand, in a separate set
of regressions (available upon request), we found that other variables predicted the importance of secrecy more than licensing, including the importance of patents, first-mover
advantage, reverse engineering, and product and process business strategies. Yet, this
might be expected, given that most firms use trade secrets in more traditional ways. In our
view, more data— specifically from industries in which licensing out plays a central role—is
needed to more fully understand the role trade secrets play in licensing negotiations and
the boundary of the firm.

R
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CONCLUSION
The central aim of intellectual property law is to encourage new innovations—which, in turn, spawns new business enterprises—for society’s benefit.366 One key pillar of intellectual property law today is the law of trade
secrecy.367 Yet, oddly, very little empirical research has focused on the usage
and effectiveness of trade secrecy for startups.368 This lacuna is particularly
problematic given that sound, systematic data is needed for policymakers to
make intelligent policy choices, such as in the recent adoption of the DTSA,
which was crafted largely based on anecdotes, guesswork, and unproven
assumptions about the power and scope of trade secret law.369
As such, the results of this study help fill a gaping void. In so doing, our
study’s results shore up some initial empirical findings, confirm some theoretical views yet contradict others, and offer new possible routes for future
scholarship and analysis. Our hope is that this Article inspires others to
undertake this difficult but extremely important endeavor, and helps policymakers and the practicing bar understand the complex and shifting dynamics underlying trade secret law, and, more broadly, the reasons for limiting or
expanding public access to information.

366 See Levine, supra note 44, at 147 n.43 (identifying one of the values of trade secrecy
as the “public interest in having free competition in the sale and manufacture of goods not
protected by a valid patent” (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 404
N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ill. 1980))).
367 See Lemley, supra note 31, at 315–16.
368 See supra Part II.
369 See Bill Donahue, 5 Things to Know About the Defend Trade Secrets Act, LAW360 (Apr.
27, 2016), https://www.law360.com/ip/articles/789239 (quoting one of the authors
(Levine) regarding the “dearth of empirical” data on trade secrets law, noting that policymakers “simply don’t know enough” about trade secrecy to enact the DTSA, and are effectively “throwing darts”).
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APPENDIX
FIGURE A1: REASONS NOT

TO

PATENT BASED
INVENTIONS

ON

PROCESS

VS.

PRODUCT

For the same unpatented innovation, which if any of the following influenced your company’s decision not to patent?
Did not want to disclose
information

41.04%
32.27%
54.01%

Cost of getting patent

66.40%

Competitors could have
invented around patent

47.64%
46.13%

Believed trade secret was
adequate protection

41.27%
34.13%
44.34%

Cost of enforcing patent

52.00%

Believed technology was
not patentable

37.74%
35.73%

No need for legal
protection

15.57%
12.27%
0%

10%

20%

30%
Process

40%

50%

60%

70%

Product

FIGURE A2: THE NUMBER OF PATENTS HELD VS.
REASON NOT TO PATENT

THE

MOST IMPORTANT
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EMPLOYEES VS. IMPORTANCE
MECHANISMS

TABLE A1: MODEL 1—FACTORS

1
patents
0.56***
firstmover
0.59***
reverseeng
0.35***
strategyprod
0.16
trademarks
0.06
Complement-assets 0.20***
copyright
0.06
strategydesign
0.06
strategyprocess
0.23***
shareeng
0.53***
strategymodel
-0.10
employs
0.001
revenue
1.5e-7
agein2008
0.027
patnum
licenseout
sellservice
sellprod
N
943
log likelihood
-1030

FOR

2
0.59***
0.66***
0.35***
0.03
0.20
0.23**
-0.17
0.03
0.32***
1.01***
-0.08
0.001
1.4e-7
0.068**
-0.00

IMPORTANCE

3
0.73***
0.60***
0.25***
-0.05
0.03
0.30***
0.04
0.17**
0.36***
0.47*
-0.15
0.001
1.4e-7
0.001

OF

OF

APPROPRIABILITY

TRADE SECRECY

4
0.58***
0.57***
0.31***
0.18
0.05
0.18**
0.04
0.07
0.21**
0.50**
-0.05
0.001
1.5e-7
0.031

5
0.55***
0.57***
0.40***
0.13
0.02
0.21**
0.07
0.14**
0.30***
0.36
-0.13
0.001
1.8e-7
0.027

6
0.55***
0.56***
0.36***
0.15
-0.00
0.23***
0.07
0.13*
0.34***
0.32
-0.13
0.001
1.9e-7
0.026

-0.19
749
-820

-0.22
-0.43*
650
-712

0.52
0.18
535
-555

531
-567

765
-846
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TABLE A2: MODEL 1—AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF FACTORS
IMPORTANCE OF TRADE SECRECY
(of each independent variable, holding others
constant at their means)

1
patents
0.062***
firstmover 0.065***
reverseeng 0.039***
0.018
strategyprod
trademarks 0.0069
0.022***
complementassets
copyright
0.0067
0.0069
strategydesign
0.026***
strategyprocess
shareeng
0.058***
0.011
strategymodel
employs
0.000091
revenue
1.6e-8
agein2008 0.0030
patnum
licenseout
sellservice
sellprod

2
0.068***
0.075***
0.040***
0.0031

3
0.083***
0.068***
0.028***
0.0061

0.023
0.026**
0.020
0.0037

4
0.067***
0.066***
0.035***
0.021

9:21

FOR

5
0.061***
0.064***
0.045***
0.014

6
0.063***
0.064***
0.042***
0.017

0.0039
0.0055
0.034*** 0.021**

0.0023
0.024**

0.000022
0.026***

0.0040
0.019**

0.0079
0.016**

0.0084
0.015*

0.0046
0.0084

0.037*** 0.041*** 0.025**

0.034*** 0.039***

0.12***
0.0094

0.041
0.014

0.053*
0.017

0.058**
0.0055

0.00011 0.000094 0.000085 0.00011
1.6e-8
1.6e-8
1.6e-8
2.0e-8
0.0077** 0.00014 0.0036
0.0030
7.3e-6
0.059
0.021
0.022

0.037
0.015
0.00011
2.2e-8
0.0029

0.025
0.049*
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TABLE A3: MODEL 2—FACTORS FOR IMPORTANCE
CONTROLLING FOR INDUSTRY

patents
firstmover
reverseeng
strategyprod
trademarks
complementassets
copyright
strategydesign
strategyprocess
shareeng
strategymodel
employs
revenue
agein2008
Patnum
licenseout
sellservice
sellprod
biotech
meddevice
software
ithardware
N
log
likelihood

9:21

[vol. 94:2
OF

TRADE SECRECY

1
0.44***
0.59***
0.36***
0.16

2
0.52***
0.66***
0.35***
0.04

3
0.59***
0.62***
0.27***
-0.07

4
0.46***
0.58***
0.31***
0.19*

5
0.44***
0.57***
0.41***
0.12

6
0.47***
0.56***
0.36***
0.14

0.08
0.20***

0.21
0.24**

0.06
0.30***

0.07
0.19**

0.04
0.22***

0.02
0.23***

0.11
0.06

-0.15
0.024

0.09
0.19**

0.09
0.06

0.12
0.14*

0.10
0.12

0.23***

0.32***

0.36***

0.21**

0.30***

0.33***

0.52**
-0.069

1.03***
-0.068

0.44
-0.11

0.50**
-0.019

0.37
-0.094

0.31
-0.11

0.001
1.5e-7
0.028

0.001
9.2e-8
0.070**
-0.0002

0.001
9.6e-8
0.001

0.001
1.4e-7
0.032

0.001
1.8e-7
0.028

0.001
1.9e-7
0.025

-0.21
0.27
-0.028
-0.38
0.071
749
-816

-0.13
-0.39
0.19
-0.16
-0.35
0.083
650
-709

0.45
0.29
0.26
-0.093
-0.46**
-0.029
943
-1024

-0.0077
-0.16
-0.34
-0.24
535
-554

0.44
-0.23
-0.49
-0.064
531
-562

0.20
-0.036
-0.51**
-0.0085
765
-840
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TABLE A4: MODEL 2—AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS CONTROLLING
INDUSTRY

patents
firstmover
reverseeng
strategyprod
trademarks
complementassets
copyright
strategydesign
strategyprocess
shareeng
strategymodel
employs
revenue
agein2008
patnum
licenseout
sellservice
sellprod
biotech
meddevice
software
ithardware

1
0.049***
0.065***
0.040***
0.018

2
0.059***
0.076***
0.040***
0.0048

3
0.066***
0.069***
0.030***
0.0084

4
0.054***
0.067***
0.036***
0.022*

5
0.049***
0.064***
0.045***
0.013

9:21

FOR

6
0.054***
0.065***
0.042***
0.016

0.0094
0.024
0.023*** 0.027**

0.0070
0.0082
0.034*** 0.021**

0.0040
0.0019
0.024*** 0.026***

0.012
0.0062

0.0095
0.021**

0.013
0.015*

0.017
0.0028

0.0099
0.0069

0.012
0.014

0.026*** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.024**

0.034*** 0.038***

0.058**
0.0076

0.041
0.011

0.12***
0.0078

0.050
0.013

0.000078 0.00011 0.00011
1.6e-8
1.1e-8
1.1e-8
0.0031
0.0080** 0.00014
0.00002
0.051

0.027
0.010
0.050**
0.0032

0.0009
0.018
0.039
0.027

0.046
0.026
0.054
0.0072

0.058**
0.0022

0.035
0.012

0.000068 0.00012
1.6e-8
2.0e-8
0.0037
0.0031

0.00010
2.2e-8
0.0028

0.033

0.015
0.045
0.021
0.019
0.040
0.0094

0.023
0.004
0.058**
0.0010

0.023
0.029
0.003
0.043
0.0078
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TABLE A5: MODEL 3—FACTORS FOR IMPORTANCE OF TRADE SECRECY
CONTROLLING FOR FUNDER TYPE

patents
firstmover
reverseeng
strategyprod
trademarks
complementassets
copyright
strategydesign
strategyprocess
shareeng
strategymodel
employs
revenue
agein2008
Patnum
licenseout
sellservice
sellprod
Ibankfunded
cbankfunded
friendsfunded
angelfunded
vcfunded
N
log likelihood

1
0.59***
0.59***
0.35***
0.20*
0.05
0.21***

2
0.62***
0.67***
0.35***
0.04
0.19
0.24**

3
0.76***
0.61***
0.24***
-0.036
0.038
0.30***

4
0.61***
0.58***
0.31***
0.20*
0.04
0.19**

5
0.57***
0.58***
0.40***
0.15
0.0077
0.22***

6
0.58***
0.57***
0.36***
0.17
-0.005
0.24***

0.051
0.057

-0.18
0.014

0.03
0.16**

0.032
0.071

0.066
0.14**

0.071
0.12*

0.22*** 0.32***

0.36*** 0.21**

0.29*** 0.33***

0.54*** 1.04***
-0.094
-0.072

0.51*
-0.15

0.53**
-0.048

0.37
-0.12

0.34
-0.13

0.001
0.001
2.3e-7
2.1e-7
0.065** 0.001
0.00036
0.51

0.001
2.0e-7
0.032

0.001
1.8e-7
0.026

0.001
2.5e-7
0.026

-0.20
-0.04
0.12
0.054
-0.046
-0.16
749
-819

-0.25
-0.46*
-0.18
0.075
0.16
-0.22
-0.076
650
-710

0.001*
1.6e-7
0.026

0.18
-0.13
0.21
-0.024
-0.079
-0.15
943
-1028

-0.17
0.17
0.040
-0.104
-0.33*
535
-552

-0.04
0.11
0.14
-0.23
-0.062
531
-566

-0.25
0.17
0.064
-0.18
-0.058
765
-844
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TABLE A6: MODEL 3—AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS

ibankfunded
cbankfunded
friendsfunded
angelfunded
vcfunded

1
0.015
0.023
0.0027
0.0088
0.017

2
0.019
0.020
0.0046
0.012
0.038*

TABLE A7: FACTORS

secrecy
firstmover
reverseeng
strategyprod
trademarks
complementassets
copyright
strategydesign
strategyprocess
shareeng
strategymodel
employs
revenue
agein2008
patnum
licenseout
sellservice
sellprod
N
log
likelihood

FOR

3
0.0047
0.013
0.016
0.026
0.0070

4
0.030
0.020
0.0073
0.021
0.0067

IMPORTANCE

OF

BY

9:21

819

FUNDER TYPE

5
0.0047
0.013
0.0061
0.0052
0.018

6
0.021
0.0085
0.0019
0.026
0.0087

PATENTING

1
0.77***
0.29***
0.16**
0.77***
0.39***
-0.13*

2
0.62***
0.12
-0.10
0.73***
0.63***
-0.33***

3
0.93***
0.34***
0.26***
0.87***
0.37***
-0.16

4
0.74***
0.28***
0.21***
0.47***
0.41***
-0.07

5
0.73***
0.32***
0.22***
0.74***
0.46***
-0.20**

6
0.69***
0.27***
0.25***
0.49***
0.45***
-0.13

-0.15
0.032

0.03
-0.078

-0.17
-0.026

-0.09
-0.010

-0.13
0.003

-0.08
0.008

-0.13*

-0.019

-0.27**

0.13

-0.23**

0.017

0.43**
-0.06

0.45
-0.05

0.82*** 0.63***
0.05
-0.05

0.26
-0.04

0.59**
-0.01

0.00
-1.5e-7
-0.031*

-0.00
-12e-7***
-0.11***
0.45***

0.00
-1.3e-7
-0.026

0.00
-1.6e-7
-0.025

0.00
-1.8e-7
-0.017

-0.07
749
-860

-2.40***
-1.36***
650
-699

0.00
-0.5e-7
-0.038*

0.067
-1.66***
943
-1070

535
-470

531
-567

765
-840
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TABLE A8: AVERAGE MARGINAL EFFECTS OF FACTORS
PATENTING

1
secrecy
0.094***
firstmover
0.035***
reverseeng 0.019**
strategyprod 0.095***
trademarks 0.047***
0.016*
complementassets
copyright
0.018
0.0039
strategydesign
0.016*
strategyprocess
shareeng
0.052**
0.0068
strategymodel
employs
9.7e-6
revenue
1.8e-8
agein2008
0.0039*
patnum
licenseout
sellservice
sellprod

27-DEC-18
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FOR

IMPORTANCE

OF

2
0.066***
0.012
0.010
0.078***
0.067***
0.035***

3
0.11***
0.042***
0.032***
0.106***
0.045***
0.019

4
0.092***
0.034***
0.026***
0.058***
0.052***
0.009

5
0.091***
0.040***
0.028***
0.091***
0.057***
0.025**

6
0.086***
0.033***
0.031***
0.060***
0.056***
0.016

0.0037
0.0084

0.021
0.0032

0.011
0.0012

0.016
0.0004

0.0094
0.0010

0.0020

0.033**

0.016

0.028**

0.0021

0.048
0.0049

0.101*** 0.079*** 0.033
0.0057
0.0069
0.0045

0.000042 8.9e-6
1.3e-7*** 1.6e-8
0.012*** 0.0031
0.0048***
0.0082

0.073**
0.0013

0.000020 0.000013 0.000029
6.7e-9
2.0e-8
2.3e-8
0.0047* 0.0031
0.0022

0.21***
0.0089

0.30***
0.17***

